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Fearful Asymmetry: Employee Free Choice and
Employer Profitability in First National Maintenance
RICHARD LITVIN*
INTRODUCTION
A chill wind now blows through the "insulat[ion protecting] employees'
jobs from [their exercise of] their organizational rights."' At common law,
employees who formed unions risked their jobs. The law did not require
employers to respect their employees' right to associate;2 indeed, it granted
employers an unlimited power to discharge.' This power and its incidents -
the blacklist, the yellow dog contract, and the runaway shop -were potent
weapons in the battle to prevent unionization.4 As a result, unions and those
employees who wanted union representation had to overcome not only
employer resistance, but also employee fear of employer retribution.5
The advent of the National Labor Relations Act' (the NLRA or Act) ap-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Bridgeport. Dickinson College, A.B. 1967;
Temple University, J.D. 1975; Yale University, L.L.M. 1976. I express special thanks to
Professors Martin B. Margulies and Jerome Wenig for their constant support and critical
commentaries. I also wish to thank my research assistants Kathleen Neary, Esq., Frank
J. Halloran, Esq., Lucia Brooks, Esq., and Catherine Teitell.Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954).
2 The powers of government were generally aligned against employee self-organization,
not in its support. See, e.g., A. Cox. LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 1-4 (1960); C.
GREGORY & H. KATZ, LABOR AND THE LAW, 52-82 (3d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as C. GREGORY].
I See Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEG. HIST.
118 (1976). Absent statutory or contractual limitations, an employer's power to terminate
the employment relationship remained unfettered until very recently. See, e.g., Comment,
Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in
Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980).
J . CARPENTER. COMPETITION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE NEEDLE TRADES,
1910-1967 (1972), summarized the problem:
Unions could not prevent discrimination against their own men. Some shop
owners compelled their workers to deposit cash security, augmented by regular
deductions from their paychecks, as insurance against joining labor unions
or participating in strikes. Other employers closed their shops long enough
to rid themselves of union members and then reopened at other locations
or under different names. Still others exchanged blacklists to prevent dis-
charged union men from obtaining work elsewhere.... [Others] posted notices
that ... they would operate their shops on an "open shop" basis-a condition
tantamount to the exclusion of all union men from employment.
Id. at 4. See generally P. TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1964); J. RAYBACK.
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR (1959).
- From 1915-1937 recognition of a union was an issue in 20/o to 50/o of all strikes.
P. EDWARDS. STRIKES IN THE UNITED STATES. 1881-1974, at 37 (1981). See also Magruder, A Half
Century of Legal Influence Upon the Development of Collective Bargaining, 50 HARV. L. REV.
1071, 1078 (1937).
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. % 151-169 (1976)). The Wagner Act has been amended in relevant part by
the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), and the Labor-
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peared to change all that.7 The Act recognized a cluster of employee associa-
tional rights,8 forbade employer "interfere[nce]" with those rights,9 and
established a system for determining the employees' free choice as to
whether and by whom to be represented.10 It was in an early case constru-
ing the NLRA that the Supreme Court broadly declared: "The policy of
the Act is to insulate employees' jobs from [the exercise of] their organiza-
tional rights."'"
Although the Court has never applied literally the Act's proscription on
interference, 2 it has often been quite solicitous of employee rights and sen-
sitive to the potential chilling effect of employer speech and conduct."3 But
Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat.
519 (1959). The current version of the Act will be hereinafter cited as NLRA.
C. GREGORY.'Supra note 2, at 224, 230, commented:
In the NLRA, however, Congress virtually ordered employers to stop resisting
the spread of unionism, telling them that the desire of their employees to
'organize was none of their business and to keep their hands off.
In brief, Congress found that the strife over organizational activities of unions
had caused so much harm to the National economy that the best way to secure
relief to the body economic was to let employees organize as they saw fit ....
See also Remarks of Senator Wagner, 78 CONG. REc. 3443 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935, at 15-17 (1949) [hereinafter
cited as LEG. HIST. NLRA].
NLRA S 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976). The other subparts of S 8(a) forbade employer
domination of unions and discrimination for or against unions, and mandated collective
bargaining. NLRA S 8(a)(2)-(5), 29 U.S.C. S 158(a) (1976). Undisputed legislative history sup-
ports the view that the other subparts of S 8(a) "amplifLy] . . . [but do not] limit in any
way the interpretation of the general provisions .... H.R. REP. No. 969,74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 15 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra note 7, at 2924. See Christensen &
Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court
and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE L.J. 1289, 1323-24 (1968).
The Supreme Court's decision in Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380
U.S. 263 (1965), has been thought by some to be inconsistent with this legislative mandate.
Christensen & Svanoe, supra. But Darlington may be read as consistent with congressional
intent, since the Court there said: "[S]ome employer decisions are so peculiarly matters
of management prerogative that they would never constitute violations of 5 8(a)(1), whether
or not they involved sound business judgment, unless they also violated S 8(a)(3)." 380 U.S.
at 269. Section 8(a)(1) has always been read to require an accommodation of employee rights
with legitimate employer interests. See infra note 12. Hence Darlington may mean nothing
more than that an employer's legitimate interests which need to be accommodated are
not limited to its exercise of "sound business judgment."
10 NLRA § 9, 29 U.S.C. S 159 (1976).
Ii Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954).
12 An employee who fails to perform the work for which he is paid or who destroys
the employer's property may be the key organizer in the plant. Firing such an employee
could seriously impede organization, but no one would seriously suggest that an employer
thereby commits an unfair labor practice. The crucial problems in such a case are causa-
tion and motivation. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced on other grounds,
662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1612 (1982).
13 Where an employer granted benefits to persuade its employees to vote against unioniza-
tion, the Court saw "a fist inside the velvet glove." NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375
U.S. 405, 409 (1964). And in balancing an employer's right of free speech against its employees'
freedom to unionize, the Court took "into account the economic dependence of the employees
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with increasing frequency the Court has ignored or discounted the impact
of employer actions, and of its own decisions, on undisputed employee
associational rights."
In First National Maintenance Corporation v. NLRB,'" the Court cut a
gaping hole in what remained of the insulation. The Act requires an
employer to bargain with the representative of its employees "with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.""' The ques-
tion expressly presented in First National Maintenance was whether an
employer must bargain over an economically motivated decision to close
part of a business.17 The Court held that an employer need not bargain over
the decision to partially shut down its operations, 8 and also asserted that
a union which insists on such bargaining violates the Act. 9
The central thesis of this article is that the Court in First National
Maintenance unwittingly handed to careful, well-advised, anti-union
employers a powerful weapon for chilling unionization." Proving motiva-
on their employer, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship,
to pick up intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a
more disinterested ear." NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969) (emphasis added).
" For example, in NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272 (1972), the Supreme
Court held that a successor employer which hires a majority of its employees from among
those of its unionized predecessor must bargain with the union, but that the successor
has no obligation to prefer the predecessor's employees in hiring its workforce. As a prac-
tical matter, Burns encourages a successor employer to free itself of its predecessor's union
by devising facially neutral hiring practices which effectively avoid employing the
predecessor's employees. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417
U.S. 249 (1974); Morris & Gaus, Successorship and the Collective Bargaining Agreement: Ac-
commodating Wiley and Burns, 59 VA. L. REV. 1359, 1391 (1973). See generally Barron, A
Theory of Protected Employer Rights: A Revisionist Analysis of the Supreme Court's Inter-
pretation of the National Labor Relations Act, 59 TEX. L. REV. 421 (1981); Getman, Section
8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32 U. CHi. L. REV. 735
(1965). (Professor Getman's views have changed. See discussion infra notes 255-81 and ac-
companying text.)
15 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
Is NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. 5 158(d) (1976).
17 In theory, bargaining over the decision itself (decision bargaining) can be distinguished
from bargaining over the effects of the decision (effects bargaining). The Court clearly
asserted that the latter is mandatory. 452 U.S. at 681-82. Indeed the Court relied on the
employees' ability to protect their interests through effects bargaining to discount their
need for decision-bargaining. See discussion infra, notes 318-21 and accompanying text. The
practical difficulties with this distinction are considered infra, note 319 and accompanying
text.
" 452 U.S. at 686.
'9 Id. at 675, n.13. The Court was merely reiterating dicta first pronounced in NLRB
v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). In Borg-Warner, it was an
employer, not a union, which insisted on bargaining on a non-mandatory subject. Hence,
the Court had no need to consider the material differences between limiting the subjects
on which management may insist and limiting those on which a union may insist (i.e., strike).
Despite Borg-Warner's vintage and the apparently universal acceptance of its applicability
to union insistence, a secondary thesis of this article is that Congress forebade such im-
plied limitations on a union's use of concerted activities. See infra notes 214-18 and accom-
panying text.
I This weapon is especially significant in light of the resurgence of union-busting. See,
19831
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tion is difficult.2 Proving that a well-counseled employer, which has built
a record to demonstrate its economic motivation, was really motivated by
anti-union animus will often be impossible.' As a result, unless First Na-
tional Maintenance is construed narrowly or the constraints on union power
to resist such employer acts are lifted, employees can depend neither on
the Board nor on their own economic weapons to protect their decision to
unionize. Thus, the potential for employer manipulation is great, and the
risk to employee free choice is severe.
The facts of First NationalMaintenance itself illustrate these dangers.'
The First National Maintenance Corporation (FNM) decided to discontinue
services at a single location hard upon the vote of its employees at that
location in favor of union representation.24 FNM claimed that its decision
was motivated solely by economics and refused to bargain with the newly
certified union.25 The employer, however, proferred only conclusory
testimony that the location which it closed was unprofitable, and no evidence
at all that it was less profitable than other non-union locations which were
not closed, or that profitability had declined at the time of the decision,
or even that it could recoup capital from the closing which it could re-invest
at a higher return."
Those employees who were terminated might reasonably have inferred
that, but for their choice of a union, they would still have their jobs. More
important, FNM's employees at other locations and even employees of other
employers, observing what had happened to the discharged employees,
might have been discouraged from exercising rights and engaging in ac-
e.g., Bernstein, Union-Busting: From Benign Neglect to Malignant Growth, 14 U.C.D. L. REV.
1 (1980) (relying on extensive testimony before congressional committees, cited id. at 1
n.3); Regulating Use of Labor Consultants, 1981 LAB. REL. Y.B. 133 (1982); Union Organizing
Campaigns and Women, id. at 225, 227; Martin, Labor Nemesis, Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1979,
at 1, col. 5.
Corbin put it aptly:
In an ancient case, Y.B. 17 Edw. IV, 2, Brian, C.J., remarked, perhaps er-
roneously, that "the devil himself knoweth not the thought of man." Every
day experience shows that man himself believes that he can discover the
thoughts of another man. This he does by inferences from the other's exter-
nal expressions, in words, in features, and in acts. Such evidence may indeed
lead to woeful error, but it is the best we have and we act upon it daily.
3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 597, at 582 n.5 (1960) (emphasis added).
The problem of proving motivation is pervasive not only in labor law, see, e.g., Mueller
Brass Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1977); Christensen & Svanoe, supra note 9, but
in all areas of the law in which discrimination is relevant. See, e.g., Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 & n.21 (1977); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1028-32 (1978); Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to
the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REv. 95, 119-24.
See infra notes 289-91 and accompanying text.
The facts are discussed in more detail infra notes 107-12.
2 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 669-70 (1981).
25 Id.
See generally Transcript of ALJ Hearing, discussed infra note 112.
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tivities supposedly protected by the ActY Yet the Court did not consider
either the difficulty of proving anti-union animus, the ease with which an
employer can build an "economic" record, or the severity of impact on
employee free choice.'
First National Maintenance has already sparked much controversy,' and
more is sure to follow. While the Court's holding was limited to "economic-
ally motivated" partial closings, a not insignificant subject, its proposed
standard for determining the duty to bargain would reach a much broader
range of cases involving "management decisions that have a substantial
impact on the continued availability of employment . . . ."0 Moreover,
its fresh, broad reading of statutory purpose has implications that go far
beyond duty to bargain issues.
Section I of this article explores the legal setting. It considers the
significance of the mandatory-permissive dichotomy, the tests that the
Court has hitherto used for classifying subjects, and the evolution of doc-
trine relating to partial closings.
Section H analyzes the Court's reasoning in FirstNationalMaintenance.
It shows that the Court's new test of bargainability is asymmetrical (heavily
weighted in favor of management's interests) and that the Court attemp-
ted to justify this by a novel reading of statutory purpose.
Section III criticizes the Court's argument on four broad grounds. First,
while the Court's reading of statutory purpose justifies consideration of
management's interests, it does not justify insulating those interests at
' On the statutory relevance of the chilling of employees generally, see infra notes 280-86
and accompanying text.
' Under the more progressive theories of the common law, a union facing such an at-
tack on its very existence would have had the right of self-defense. See C. GREGORY, supra
note 2, at 76-82. Since the Court apparently approved the notion that a union may not
use its economic weapons to force bargaining over a nonmandatory subject, First Nat'l
Maintenance may put employers in a better position to use partial closings to thwart unioniza-
tion than they would have been before the Act. See Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm
in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1547 (1981), who argues that the theory of "in-
dustrial pluralism" leads to such results: "[t]he Act guarantees the company's presence
at the bargaining table, but despite the mandate in its statement of purpose, it does not
equalize the bargaining power of the parties. If anything, it places limits on many of the
traditional sources of the union's strength" (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
I See, e.g., Gould, The Supreme Court's Labor and Employment Docket in the 1980 Term:
Justice Brennan's Term, 53 U. COLO. L. RaV. 1, 5-18 (1981); Harper, Leveling the Road from
Borg-Warner to First National Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA.
L. REV. 1447 (1982); Irving, Closing and Sales of Businesses: A Settled Area?, 33 LAB. L.J. 218
(1982); The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 329-38 (1981); Note, Enforcing
the NLRA: The Need for a Duty to Bargain over Partial Plant Closings, 60 TEx. L. REV.
279 (1982). See also Barron, supra note 14, at 434-38; Van Wezel Stone, supra note 28, at
1544-59. For valuable commentary on the case before it reached the Court, see Heinsz,
The Partial-Closing Conundrum: The Duty of Employers and Unions to Bargain in Good
Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 71 (1981); Note, Partial Closings: The Scope of an Employer's Duty to
Bargain, 61 B.U.L. REv. 735 (1981).
" See First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 676.
1983]
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the expense of chilling employee free choice. Second, Congress specifically
protected the employees' right to use their economic weapons absent ex-
press statutory limitations thereon; the requirement that unions bargain
in good faith as to "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment" cannot reasonably be read as providing such a limitation. Third, an
appropriate (neutral) balancing of interests shows that the Court's
"employer-protective" rule, at least if broadly construed, seriously and
systematically threatens employee free choice; the alternative "employee-
protective" rule poses no such risks to employer profitability. Fourth, the
doctrine of judicial deference to administrative authority is particularly
appropriate to the issue of the scope of bargaining under the NLRA.
I. THE LEGAL SETTING
A. The Statutory Basis
First National Maintenance must be understood in the context of the
statutory and case law history through which federal regulation of the sub-
jects of collective bargaining developed. The original Act (the Wagner Act
of 1935) spoke cryptically, if at all, of the scope of the duty to bargain. In
section 8(a)(5)3" Congress declared it an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 9(a)." And section 9(a)3" added that the
majority's representatives "shall be the exclusive representatives ... in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment."
These provisions could have been read separately. Under that approach,
section 8(a)(5) would have required that an employer accord true recogni-
tion to the properly selected union, but would not have given the Board
authority to define "the scope of the ensuing negotiations."' And section
9(a) would .have established only the topics on which the selection of a union
would preclude an employer from bargaining with individual employees'
or from granting exclusive status to a minority union; but it would not have
required an employer to bargain on the topics. 5 Indeed, the oft-cited
language of Senator Walsh, the chairman of the Senate Committee on
Education and Labor, supported that reading:
When the employees have chosen their organization, when they have
selected their representatives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort
", NLRA 5 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(5) (1976).
, NLRA 5 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations
Board, 63 HARV. L. REv. 389, 394 (1950).
' See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
' See ILGWU v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp.), 366 U.S. 731 (1961). Cf. Retail
Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962).
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them to the door of their employer and say, "Here they are, the legal
representatives of your employees." What happens behind those doors
is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it 3
Alternatively, the sections could have been read together as establishing
that if an employer refused to bargain on any topic within the union's ex-
clusive competence under section 9(a), it would violate section 8(a)(5).
Though the statutory language does not clearly establish Congress'
original intent on this point, the Board soon concluded that it could not
meaningfully enforce the duty to bargain unless it could "identify the plant
relationships subjected by the statute to the obligation to bargain."37 The
Board then proceeded to identify such mandatory subjects of bargaining
as work schedules,' subcontracting, 9 and pensions. 0 In passing the Taft-
Hartley Act in 1947, Congress clearly endorsed the Board's position by
amending the NLRA to include in section 8(d) a definition of "collective
bargaining" as "the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer
and the representative of the employees to ... confer ... with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. '4'
B. The Administrative and Judicial Framework
1. Incidents of the Mandatory-Permissive Classification
The Board has gone beyond the literal notion that an employer (or union)
fulfills its duty to bargain on mandatory subjects if it engages in a reasoned
discussion without foreclosing at the outset the possibility of
accommodation.42 With the Supreme Court's approval,4 the Board has
recognized a constructive refusal to bargain in a variety of contexts." Under
79 CONG. REC. 7660 (1935) (emphasis added).
Findling & Colby, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations
Board-Another View, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 170, 182 (1951).
Wilson & Co., 19 N.L.R.B. 990, 999, enforced, 115 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1940).
Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946), enforcement denied on other grounds,
161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947).
" Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, enforced, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 960 (1949). For an extensive analysis of the Board opinions defining mandatory
subjects of bargaining prior to the adoption of the Taft-Hartley Act, see Cox & Dunlop,
supra note 33, at 391-401. Cox and Dunlop decried this "increasing tendency towards govern-
ment regulation of both the processes of collective bargaining and the terms of collective
agreements"; but even they recognized that some movement in that direction "was perhaps
inevitable." Id. at 389-90.
41 Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 142-43 (1947), 29 U.S.C. S 158(d) (1976). The Taft-Hartley Act
also amended the NLRA by extending the duty to bargain to unions. 29 U.S.C. 5 158(b) (1976).
' General Electric Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964), enforced, 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970). See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477
(1960).
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
" The Board so held in many early cases. See, e.g., Wilson & Co., 19 N.,.R.B. 990, enforced,
115 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1940). The Supreme Court approved this doctrine, while leaving open
1983]
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this doctrine, an employer (or a union) which institutes a unilateral change
on a mandatory subject without first bargaining to impasse is deemed to
have refused to bargain.45
Similarly, the Board has gone beyond the literal proposition that either
party may refuse to discuss a permissive subject, holding that an employer
who insists to impasse that a union accede to its position on a permissive
subject (or uses its economic power to gain agreement) is deemed to have
refused to bargain.46 In NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp. ,4
a case critical to the understanding of First National Maintenance, the
Supreme Court approved the Board's rule that employer insistence on a
permissive subject amounts to a refusal to bargain. Although the majority
never discussed whether the same rule should apply to union insistence
on a non-mandatory subject, Justice Harlan in dissent casually equated the
situations -denying the appropriateness of the rule to either.48 This exten-
tion is, at least superficially, persuasive; for sections 8(a)(5) and (b)(3) make
it an unfair labor practice for either an employer or a union "to refuse to
bargain collectively," and section 8(d) provides a single definition for col-
lective bargaining. 9
Two other facets of bargaining should be noted. An employer may insist
to impasse on retaining (or, more properly, regaining) unilateral control
over a mandatory topic, by including it in a management rights clause.'
the possibility that in some cases an employer might successfully justify its unilateral ac-
tion. Katz, 369 U.S. at 748.
" Katz, 369 U.S. %t 743. It should be noted that the extension of this rule to unions
is less clear. In NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960), the Supreme
Court rejected the Board's finding that a union violated its duty to bargain under § 8(b)(3)
by engaging in a partial work stoppage which, in effect, temporarily changed work prac-
tices. More recently, the Second Circuit found that a union which had unilaterally adopted
and enforced a work rule limiting production of journeymen painters to ten rooms a week
had violated its duty to bargain. New York Dist. Council No. 9 v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 783
(2d Cir. 1971).
"' Dalton Tel. Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 1001 (1949), enforced, 187 F.2d 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 824 (1951).
17 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
48 Id. at 359.
Although the principle of Borg-Warner has been criticized, Harlan's suggestion that
the doctrine must be equally applied to unions has been universally accepted. See e.g., First
Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 675 n.13; The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV.
17, 329 n.2 (1981); R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 523-24 (1976). This article contends
that the extension of Borg-Warner to unions squarely conflicts with legislative history and
statutory policy. See infra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
I NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952). The Court reasoned to
this consequence from § 8(d) of the Act which defines the obligation to bargain as "not
compel[ling] either party to agree to a proposal or requir[ing] the making of a concession."
29 U.S.C. S 158(d) (1976). In American Nat'l Ins. the proposed management rights clause
covered but a few mandatory topics. In later cases employers have insisted on manage-
ment rights clauses so broad that they would leave employees effectively worse off under
a collective agreement than without it. The courts of appeals have split on the propriety
of such demands. Compare White v. NLRB, 255 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1958) (held proper over
the stinging dissent of Judge Rives) with NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131,
[Vol. 58:433
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Additionally, if an employer has insisted to impasse on its position on a
mandatory topic, it may then unilaterally institute its proposal.51
In short, these decisions establish constructive rights and limitations aris-
ing from the classification of a subject as either mandatory or permissive.
The net result is that, even as to mandatory subjects, the ultimate decision-
making authority resides in the employer. If no agreement is reached, the
employer may act unilaterally; but the union is free to employ its economic
weapons. If, on the other hand, a subject is classified as permissive, the
employer is free to act without bargaining and, under the Borg-Warner
dicta, the union is precluded from concerted opposition.52
2. Categorizing Management Decisions which "Necessarily Result"
in Termination of Bargaining Unit Jobs: Fibreboard
Given the consequences which attach to the mandatory-permissive
classification, the approach to making that classification is crucial. Yet Borg-
Warner, the leading case in the area, cast a dim light on the problem. In
that case, the employer had insisted to impasse that it would not sign a
collective bargaining agreement unless it contained a clause requiring that
in future negotiations the union submit the company's final offer to a secret
ballot of all employees in the bargaining unit.' The Court concluded that
this proposal did not directly concern "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment," but rather involved the union's internal decision-
making processes.'
Borg-Warner taught only the easy lesson that the process by which an
employer or a union selects its substantive position on a mandatory sub-
ject is not itself a mandatory subject of bargaining. Had the Court held
otherwise, it would have aided a strong union or employer in crippling the
other's independence. It would have undermined the very system of col-
lective bargaining.' Thus, Borg-Warner (if it applies to unions) would pro-
135 (1st Cir. 1953) (held improper where the employer did not "make some reasonable ef-
fort in some direction"). Cf. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970) (Board may not
remedy refusal to bargain by requiring agreement even to innocuous clause providing for
dues check off).
' NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) (by implication).
NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. at 34849.
Id. at 345-46.
r4 Id. at 349. Borg-Warner was seeking to impose by contract a fundamental change
in the nature of the collective bargaining relationship that Congress had specifically re-
jected. The original Hartley Bill would have required, prior to a strike, "a secret ballot
of the employees in the bargaining unit concerned on the question whether such employees
desire to reject the employer's last offer of settlement and to strike" H.R. 3020, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess., S 2(11)(B)(vi)(e) (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 39,165-66 (1948) [hereinafter cited as LEG. HIST. LMRA].
This provision was dropped in conference. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34, 93
CONG. REc. 6361 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. LMRA 538.
W Indeed, Professor Cox argued that Borg-Warner's proposal should have been treated
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scribe a union's insistence that an employer submit plant closing decisions
to a majority vote of its stockholders. But it would provide no guidance
for determining which substantive proposals of an employer or of a union
are mandatory issues of bargaining and which are not.
The battle over whether management decisions which lead inevitably
to job termination are mandatory has been particularly hard fought. Job
security is of vital concern to employees and their representatives.' Good
wages and working conditions do not benefit employees who lose their jobs.
Indeed, some of the earliest development of labor self-consciousness came
when technological development threatened to displace skilled workers and
render their craft training useless.57 In addition, plant relocation, the
runaway shop, has long concerned employees in industries with low capital
investment. 8
Not surprisingly, management has steadfastly resisted any intrusion on
its freedom to pursue efficiency (profit) 9 Many significant management
decisions in pursuit of profit or efficiency threaten the job security of some
employees. In deciding to produce a new product, an employer may com-
mit capital that it could have invested in maintaining or improving its ex-
isting products. In deciding to automate, it may reduce its need for labor
or alter its need for certain skills. Whether directly or indirectly, inten-
tionally or inadvertently, a myriad of employer decisions affect bargain-
ing unit jobs.
From its inception, the Board generally found employer decisions affect-
not as permissive, but as "illegal." Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October
Term, 1957, 44 Va. L. Rev. 1057, 1084-85 (1958); but cf. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 28,
at 1511 (describing and rejecting the model of "industrial pluralism" which she defines
as "the view that collective bargaining is self-government by management and labor: manage-
ment and labor are considered to be equal parties who jointly determine the conditions
of the -sale of labor power:')
Platt, The Duty to Bargain as Applied to Management Decisions, 19 LAB. L.J. 143,144
(1968) summarized the labor viewpoint:
[L]abor, through the years .... has fought for seniority rights, for the assign-
ment of work to those more appropriately entitled to it, for overtime pay,
fringe benefits and the cushioning of serious problems caused by automation
and sharp technological changes. Any debilitation in employment security ...
is a clear and present threat to the very essence of trade unionism.
5 RAYBACK, supra note 4, at 159-60 (machinery and Knights of Labor).
J. CARPENTER, supra note 4, at 547-51. The relationship between low capital investment
and the chilling affect of the First Nat'l Maintenance rule is discussed infra notes 322-28
and accompanying text.
s Platt, supra note 56, at 144, framed the management view:
Efficiency ... is the sole responsibility of management; it has to determine
policy in the interest of its business with regard for such factors as the state
of the economy, position of the industry, the strategy of competitors; it has
to consider the consumers, the government and its own employees; the deci-
sion has to be made amidst compromise situations and profitability; it must
bear in mind the risk of leakage of information; and perhaps most of all, it
is a challenge to managerial competence which, in serious times, may affect
the very survival of the company.
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ing job security to be mandatory subjects;' but its approach to the prob-
lem remained unsettled. 1 The Supreme Court first scrutinized the Board's
approach to job security issues in the celebrated case Fibreboard Paper
Products v. NLRB.' There the union, which for many years had represented
a unit composed solely of maintenance employees at the employer's plant,
properly notified the employer that it would seek modifications of the ex-
isting agreement at its termination. The employer refused to negotiate on
the ground that it had already decided, on economic grounds, to discharge
all the members of the bargaining unit and to have their work done by
employees of a subcontractor. In upholding the Board's finding that an
employer's economically motivated decision to subcontract is a mandatory
subject, the Court considered four factors: statutory language, statutory
purpose, amenability to bargaining, and impact on managerial freedom.6
In Fibreboard each factor supported the view that bargaining was man-
See, e.g., Hoosier Veneer Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 907 (1940), modified and enforced sub nom.,
NLRB v. Bachelder, 120 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1941) (duty to bargain over reinstatement of
discharged employees); Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946) (subcontracting
some bargaining unit work), enforcement denied on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947).
11 In Timken, for example, the Board held that employer subcontracting decisions that
affect bargaining unit work are mandatory subjects. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B.
500, 518 (1946), enforcement denied on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947) (cited with
approval in Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959)). Fifteen
years later, in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961), the Board found
an employer's unilateral subcontracting not mandatory because the subcontract replaced all
employees in the bargaining unit. The Board explained that the decision was "not concern-
ed with the conditions of employment of employees within an existing bargaining unit;
it involves, rather, the question whether the employment relationship still exists". Id. at
1561. This distinction would, of course, make the existence of a duty to bargain hinge both
on the Board's earlier determination of the bargaining unit and on the breadth of the
managerial decision to subcontract.
This seems odd for several reasons. First, the Act authorized the Board to determine
the bargaining unit in order "to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the
rights guaranteed by this Act." NLRA S 9(b), 29 U.S.C. S 159(b) (1976). In construing this
mandate, the Board has routinely presumed that employees at a single location of a multi-
location employer constitute an appropriate bargaining unit. See, e.g., NLRB v. Frisch's
Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 551 (1964), enforcement denied, 356 F.2d 895 (7th Cir.
1966) (retail chain); Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 629 (1962) (manufacturing);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1408 (1966) (life insurance offices); Wyandotte Sav-
ings Bank, 245 N.L.R.B. 943 (1979) (branch banks). Yet if an employer can avoid its duty
to bargain by replacing the whole bargaining unit, then the Board's approval of narrow
bargaining units may in the end frustrate the employees' right to bargain.
Second, the Act imposes on employers the duty to bargain, a duty that many would
prefer to avoid. But the Board's distinction would place the existence of the duty in the
hands of those same employers.
The Board itself soon abandoned this strange criterion. In Town & Country Mfg. Co.,
136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963), it overruled Fibreboard.
Then, on rehearing, it reversed the decision in Fibreboard itself. Fibreboard Paper Pro-
ducts Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962). These shifts, of course, coincided with changes in Board
membership which followed the elections first of President Eisenhower and then of Presi-
dent Kennedy. See discussion infra notes 375-78 and accompanying text.
379 U.S. 203 (1964).
Id. at 210-16.
1983]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
datory; therefore, the Court did not expressly indicate how the factors
should be treated in a case where they conflict. Nonetheless, what the Court
did say suggests the following approach: a managerial decision which
"necessarily results" in termination of bargaining unit jobs is subject to
mandatory bargaining unless the employer can demonstrate that the deci-
sion is of a type not amenable to bargaining or that bargaining itself would
have so abridged managerial freedom as to frustrate the purpose of the
Act. 4 The following analysis of the Court's four factors supports and ex-
pands this interpretation of the Fibreboard decision.
The court concluded that managerial decisions from which "termination
of employment ... necessarily results" fall within the literal scope of sec-
tion 8(d)'s "terms and conditions of employment." 5 While the Court did not
state the significance of this conclusion," one may infer that it meant
thereby to dispose of the parade of horribles argument, i.e., that if
employers were required to bargain over all decisions which might affect
job security, management would be crippled.'7 By distinguishing managerial
decisions which necessarily result in job termination from those which only
indirectly or potentially affect job security, the Court protected manage-
ment's core interest and gave fair notice of which decisions were subject
to the duty to bargain."'
As Learned Hand wrote, "There is no surer way to misread any docu-
ment than to read it literally." 9 Accordingly, the Court went on to reason
that mandatory bargaining over subcontracting promoted "the fundamen-
tal purpose of the Act by bringing a problem of vital concern to labor and
management within the framework established by Congress as most con-
ducive to industrial peace.""° Again, the Court failed to spell out the
significance of its conclusion. However, one may infer that where the Court
The Court explicitly limited its holding to "the type of 'contracting out' involved in
this case." Id. at 215. Its reasoning, however, indicated that other decisions which "necessarily
result" in job termination fall, on their face, within the language and purpose of the Act.
Id. at 210 (emphasis added).
The Court could not have meant that the plain meaning precluded judicial inquiry
into legislative purpose, since it went on to discuss the fit between the literal meaning
and the purpose of the Act. Cf. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain Meaning Rule"
and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299 (1975).
But see Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in
the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892 (1982) (revival of literalism).
67 Justice Stewart's concurrence paraded just such horribles: "Decisions concerning the
volume and kind of advertising expenditures, product design, the manner of financing, and
sales, all may bear upon the security of workers' jobs." 379 U.S. at 223.
Uncertainty in this area may be particularly devastating to employers. Thus, in
Fibreboard itself, the remedy for the employer's unilateral subcontracting was an order
to rehire with back pay. Rather than risk such a remedy, an employer might bargain on
doubtful issues. These uncertainty costs played a large part in the Court's reasoning in
First Nat'l Maintenance. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
" Giuseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944), affd sub no=n., Gemsco, Inc. v.
Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945).
" 379 U.S. at 211 (emphasis added).
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finds that a particular construction of a statute fits its literal meaning and
furthers its fundamental purpose, the Court means to establish a presump-
tion "to guide private behavior and to facilitate the resolution of concrete
cases."
7 1
To show that subcontracting is amenable to bargaining, the Court relied
both on industrial practice (many collective bargaining agreements limit
subcontracting)' and on the nature of the employer's specific concern (here,
the high cost of its maintenance operation)." When, then, might a manage-
ment decision not be amenable to bargaining? If neither the cost nor the
productivity of labor has any bearing on the employer's decision, then
bargaining over the decision itself (as opposed to bargaining over its ef-
fects) would be futile. Consider an employer, dependent on its reputation
for the marketability of its product, which suffers a sudden, overwhelm-
ing blow to that reputation so that its market dries up. Nothing the union
could say would have any relevance to the decision to close. One could argue
that good faith bargaining is, in fact, impossible and that requiring the
employer to go through the motions of bargaining would not further any
statutory purpose.
Finally, the Court tersely noted that, since the work was to be done in
the same manner and place with no major shift in capital, decision-
bargaining would not "signficantly abridge" managerial freedom. ' Once
more the Court left unspoken the relevance of its finding about managerial
freedom. But if an application of a statute fits its terms and actually pro-
motes its fundamental purpose, what judicial inquiry remains?
Three possibilities are apparent. First, the construction might promote
one "fundamental" purpose while frustrating another equally or "more fun-
damental" purpose. Second, it might further the purpose of the statute while
frustrating that of another statute. Third, it might be unconstitutional."0
Apparently, the Court concluded that none of these possibilities was a prob-
lem on the facts of Fibreboard. It left open, however, their consideration
in other cases involving management decisions which necessitate job
termination.
Disturbed by the "radical implications" of the Court's opinion, Justice
11 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 45 (1978) (referring to antitrust law).
379 U.S. at 211-12 & n.7.
379 U.S. at 213-14.
' A dramatic case of this sort occurred as a result of the publicity given to the out-
break of "Legionaire's Disease" among the guests of the Bellevue Stratford Hotel in
Philadelphia. Widespread fear destroyed the hotel's business. After a period of extreme
financial loss, the hotel closed, without first bargaining with its employees' union. (Materials
on file with author.)
75 379 U.S. at 213.
11 Justice Stewart's concurrence hinted that he saw constitutional problems with any
broader incursion on management prerogatives. 379 U.S. at 226. Cf. Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a state's unreasonable and arbitrary interference with in-
dividual's right to contract is unconstitutional).
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Stewart attempted to reduce its impact by insisting that the Court had
"not decide[d] that every managerial decision which necessarily terminates
an individual's employment is subject to the duty to bargain. 7 Indeed, he
concurred only because he found the case to be an exception to the general
rule that "management decisions which are fundamental to the basic direc-
tion of a corporate enterprise or which impinge only indirectly upon employ-
ment security should be excluded from" the area of mandatory bargaining."
Fibreboard was, of course, only the opening foray in the battle to establish
the ground rules for bargaining over job termination decisions. It remained
to be seen how the Board and the courts would apply the Act to a myriad
of managerial decisions which necessarily result in job termination, e.g.,
decisions to subcontract bargaining unit work to be performed off the
premises, to close a single part of a plant, to close one location of a multi-
location business, to relocate part of a business, to sell, to automate, and
so forth. Before these issues could be addressed, the Supreme Court decided
another case which, arguably, has had great importance in determining the
duty to bargain over plant closings.
3. Limiting Management's Ultimate Authority to Terminate Employment
by Closing Part of Its Business: Darlington
Fibreboard concerned only an employer's duty to bargain over job-
terminating decisions, not the employer's power to make the ultimate deci-
sion to close its facilities. In Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufac-
turing Co.,'9 the Supreme Court considered the limitations placed by sec-
tion 8(a)(3)8" on management's ultimate power to close part or all of its
business. It held that while an employer has an absolute right to close its
whole business irrespective of motive or effect, it may not close part of
its business when both its motive and the foreseeable effect of its action
are to chill unionism at its other locations. 1
In Darlington, the employer closed its plant immediately after its
employees had voted for a union. Had the Court required proof only that
the employer intended to punish or to discriminate against the terminated
379 U.S. at 218 (Stewart, J., concurring).
7 Id. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart's disagreement with the majority
turned on his reading of statutory purpose. First, he claimed that Congress' specific pur-
pose in § 8(d) was to limit the issues of mandatory bargaining. Second, while he agreed
with the majority that industrial peace was a fundamental purpose of the Act, he argued
that, since Borg-Warner forbids the use of economic weapons over non-mandatory subjects,
a narrow construction of mandatory topics would equally serve that purpose. Id. at 221
n.6. See discussion infra note 163.
380 U.S. 263 (1965.
'o 29 U.S.C. 5 158(a)(3) (1976) which provides that "[it shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer ... by discrimination ... to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization .. .
" 380 U.S. at 274-75.
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employees, it would have broken no new ground.2 But the Court went fur-
ther by announcing that a partial closing would not violate section 8(a)(3)
unless the employer's purpose was to chill unionization at its other
locations." It explained this novel requirement as necessary "[fin an area
that trenches so closely upon otherwise legitimate employer prerogatives."'u
4. Reconciling Fibreboard and Darlington
Although they can easily be distinguished, the tension between
Fibreboard and Darlington portended future conflict. While Fibreboard em-
phasized congressional intent to achieve industrial peace through collec-
tive bargaining, Darlington read the Act as permitting anti-union plant clos-
ings to avoid that same bargaining process, at least where "managerial
prerogative" was involved.5 The opinions can be reconciled in two ways
with very different implications.
First, the cases can be distinguished on the basis of the differing
characteristics of sections (8)(a)(3) and (5). Section 8(a)(3) limits management's
ultimate authority to terminate employment;88 section 8(a)(5) requires only
that an employer bargain in good faith to impasse before instituting its
decisions.' Hence, section 8(a)(3) cuts closer to the "core of entrepreneurial
control" than does section 8(a)(5). If section 8(a)(5) does not seriously im-
pair managerial prerogative, then the rationale of Darlington would not
limit Fibreboard.
Alternatively, the cases can be distinguished on their facts. InFibreboard
the employer closed only part of its business at the location, though it
See generally Christensen & Svanoe, supra note 9.
In support, the Court cited only one inapposite case. In Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 365 U.S. 667 (1961), the employer, at the instance of the union, fired a union
member who had violated a hiring hall agreement. The Court recognized that a hiring
hall, or any benefit obtained or service provided by a union, may encourage union member-
ship. But encouragment (or discouragement) is forbidden only if it is prompted by discrimina-
tion. The two concurring Justices argued that S 8(a)(3) required an intent to encourage
or discourage before the conduct could be found unlawful. Even the concurrence contained
no hint that this intent must be to encourage or discourage employees who were not, sub-
ject to the hiring hall agreement. Thus, neither the majority nor the concurrence supports
the proposition that an employer who closes a plant because the immediate employees
selected a union is not liable absent proof of intent to chill employees at locations other
than the one being closed.
380 U.S. at 276.
The Board had already found that Darlington had closed because of the antiunion
animus of its president, Roger Milliken. This finding was supported by substantial evidence
including campaign threats that he would close if the employees voted for the union. 380
U.S. at 265. Thus had Milliken not left a trail of evidence that he had closed in order to
send a message to the employees at other locations, Darlington would not have been liable.
See Darlington Mfg. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1967), enforced, 397 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1023 (1969), discussed infra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
, 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(3) (1976).
'7 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(5) (1976).
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dismissed the entire bargaining unit. It then replaced its former employees
with those of a subcontractor. In Darlington, on the other hand, the
employer totally closed its operations at a discrete location. It did not
transfer that work to other employees- or at least there was no evidence
that it had made such a transfer. It can then be argued that the relevant
distinction is between decisions affecting working capital, as in Fibreboard,
and decisions affecting investment capital, as in Darlington.' On that theory,
the underlying philosophy of Darlington would require that there be no
duty to bargain over managerial decisions which affect investment capital.
This reading would, in effect, limit Fibreboard to its facts.
The Board has generally followed the first path by emphasizing the dif-
ferences between the relevant provisions of the statute; the courts of ap-
peals, the second, stressing differences in the facts. The leading Board deci-
sion was Ozark Trailers, Inc." The employer there closed one of its three
plants for economic reasons: lack of productivity, poor workmanship, and
inefficient plant design. In rejecting the claim that Darlington precluded
it from imposing a duty to bargain on such facts, the Board said:
We perceive nothing in that portion of the Darlington decision dealing
with the discriminatory partial closing of a business which suggests the
inapplicability of the collective-bargaining requirement of the Act to
Respondents' decision to close down the Ozark plant. Indeed, as the
Darlington decision affirms the propriety of the application of Section
8(a)(3) to a partial closing of a business, it would be anomalous to find
that Section 8(a)(5) is without governing authority in such situations.'
Then, following the reasoning of Fibreboard, the Board found that bargain-
ing would promote the statutory purpose because management's decision
was rooted, at least in part, in labor costs. The employer had claimed that
Fibreboard was inapposite because the impact on managerial freedom would
be substantially greater in a plant closing case than in a subcontracting
case.2 The Board, however, answered that the impact on managerial
freedom in the two situations was equal- and slight; all that mandatory
bargaining requires is "full and frank discussion . .. explor[ing] possible
alternatives... [following the failure of which] the employer is wholly free
to make and effectuate his decision. 9 3 Finally, the Board assessed the im-
pact on managerial freedom as not perceptibly greater than the impact that
would flow in any case from mandatory bargaining over the effects of a
closing decision: "[T]he effects are so inextricably interwoven with the deci-
165 N.L.R.B. 1074.
Comment, "Partial Terminations"-A Choice Between Bargaining Equality and Economic
Efficiency, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1089 (1967).
0 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966).
" Id. at 565.
Id. at 568.
93Id.
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sion itself that bargaining limited to effects will not be meaningful if it must
be carried on within a framework of a decision which cannot be revised."94
As a result, Ozark established the Board's view that, as a general rule,
an employer's interest in managerial autonomy is insufficient to justify a
refusal to bargain over plant closing decisions based on those economic con-
siderations which are the ordinary grist of collective bargaining. In suc-
ceeding cases the Board considered whether the facts demonstrated
nonamenability to bargaining or greater than usual impact on managerial
autonomy. The Board consistently found no duty to bargain, whether over
subcontracting or plant closing, where the employer's decision clearly rests
on economic considerations as to which the cost or quality of labor was
irrelevant. 5
With the change in composition under President Nixon, the Board also
exempted decisions to sell part of a business96 or to terminate a particular
line of business97 from mandatory bargaining on the ground that they more
deeply involve managerial autonomy than do ordinary closing decisions.
Thus, the Board carved out limited exceptions to (or recognized certain facts
as rebutting) the presumption that bargaining over job termination deci-
sions is mandatory.9
At first, the courts of appeals almost universally0 0 rejected the Board's
approach to partial closings.10' Some emphasized a broad reading of Darl-
ington, stating that "the finding of lack of antiunion motivation in [a par-
tial] closing.., for economic reasons precludes a finding of [an] unfair labor
Id. at 570.
Sucesion Mario Mercado E Higos, 161 NL.R.B. 696 (1966) (subcontracting to avoid
food spoilage due to mechanical problems and loss of credit); Raskin Packing Co., 246 N.L.R.B.
78 (1979) (where closing due to loss of credit, no duty to notify union prior to action; duty
to bargain does arise if company discusses reopening and union requests bargaining).
I General Motors Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. 951 (1971), petition for review denied sub nom.,
UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972). "[Dlecisions ... in which a significant invest-
ment or withdrawal of capital will affect the scope and ultimate direction of an enterprise"
are matters essentially financial and managerial in nature. 191 N.L.R.B. at 952. Members
Fanning and Brown, the carryovers, dissented.
Summit Tooling Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 479 (1972) (Member Fanning dissented).
The Board majority considered such decisions to be closer to the core of entrepreneurial
control, but did not explain how this finding justified its refusal to apply a clear mandate
of Congress to cases within the statutory purview. Each of the cases cited supra notes
96-97, however, could have been explained on the basis that bargaining would have been
futile because labor costs and productivity bore no relationship to the decisions.
" Therefore, John Irving, formerly the NLRB's General Counsel, exaggerated when he
wrote: "[Tihe Board has consistently held that there is a duty to bargain about [partial
closing] decision[s], except in the rarest circumstances." Supra note 29, at 220.
. However, in an early case the Fifth Circuit agreed with the Board that partial closing
decisions were subject to mandatory bargaining. NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 361 F.2d
512 (5th Cir. 1966) (refusing to require bargaining where passage of time had rendered
bargaining futile).
101 This repeated refusal of the courts of appeals to enforce Board orders extending
Fibreboard beyond its facts led to a premature critique of its demise. Rabin, The Decline
and Fall of Fibreboard, 24 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 237 (1972).
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practice in refusing to bargain ... [over] the closing...."102 Others viewed
Fibreboard as limited to cases where managerial autonomy is not infring-
ed upon because the employer makes no change in operations, but merely
replaces its employees with employees of another employer doing the same
work in the same way at the same place.'1
Not until recently did some circuits take the broader view of Fibreboard
as establishing a presumptive duty to bargain over job terminating
decisions."4 Given the recurrence and importance of the issue and the con-
flict among the circuits and between some circuits and the Board, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
II. FIRST NATIONAL MAINTENANCE
In every case before First National Maintenance in which the Court had
considered an employer's duty to bargain, it had read the statutory phrase
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" '05 broadly
to include all items directly and substantially affecting employee
self-interest.1"" Only in section 8(a)(3) cases such as Darlington had the Court
102 NLRB v. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, 346 F.2d 897, 902 (8th Cir. 1965)
(Justice, then Judge, Blackmun, who wrote the opinion in First Nat'l Maintenance, was
on the panel). See Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030, 1039 (8th Cir. 1976); NLRB
v. Edward M. Rude Carrier Corp., 79 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 11,615 (reported without opinion,
541 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1976)); NLRB v. Thompson Transp. Co., 406 F.2d 698, 703 (10th Cir.
1969). None of these cases considered the differences in policy between SS 8(a)(3) and (5)
or the different consequences incident to violations thereof.
103 See, e.g., NLRB v. International Harvester, 618 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Royal
Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3rd Cir. 1965).
104 See, e.g., Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720 (3rd Cir. 1978) (remand-
ing to Board to determine whether, on balance of parties' interests, presumption was over-
come); NLRB v. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980) (presumption
rebuttable "by showing that purposes of the statute would not be furthered by imposition
of a duty to bargain" id. at 601), rev'd, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
105 NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
00 Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959), exemplifies this con-
struction. Oliver involved a collective bargaining provision which set a minimum rental
that an owner-driver (one who drives his own trucks for a carrier) must receive from a
signatory trucking company. An owner-driver challenged this restriction under state anti-
trust law. The Supreme Court found that state law was pre-empted on the ground that
rental conditions are a mandatory subject under the NLRA. The Court reasoned that if
rental payment failed to cover the owner-driver's costs of ownership, he would have to
make up the difference out of his "wages:' Id. at 294. Thus, the minimum rental provision
assured that the owner-driver's net wage would be no less than that of employee-drivers.
But it was not clear that the owner-driver was an "employee" within the coverage of
the Act, rather than an "independent contractor." (The definition of "employee" in the
NLRA has specifically excluded independent contractors. NLRA S 8(d), 29 U.S.C. S 152(3)
(1976).) The Court never squarely faced this question, because another argument rendered
it moot. 358 U.S. at 287. The sufficiency of rental income to cover the costs of owner-drivers
is a matter "of vital concern to ... employed drivers." Id. at 294. If a carrier could require "
an owner-driver to rent to it at a loss, it would effectively reduce its labor costs. It would
then have an incentive to replace employee-drivers with owner-drivers. Thus, the Court
classified the minimum rental provision as mandatory not because of its relatively direct
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insulated managerial prerogative. The Court's decision in First National
Maintenance, however, significantly departed from this consistent and ex-
pansive reading of section 8(d). First National Maintenance Corporation
(FNM), as was its wont, contracted to provide maintenance service for
Greenpark Care Center (Greenpark), a nursing home. FNM agreed to supply
labor and supervision and, in return, Greenpark agreed to provide equip-
ment and supplies and to pay FNM's labor costs plus a $500 per week
management fee. Either party could cancel upon thirty days written notice,
but Greenpark promised not to hire any FNM employee within ninety days
of termination.
Six months after it had entered into this agreement, FNM accepted a
cut in its management fee to $250 per week. Five months later the FNM
employees at the Greenpark location chose union representation at a Board-
conducted election.1 Only after the Board had certified the union, did FNM
notify Greenpark that it was terminating the contract in thirty days, unless
Greenpark restored the original management fee. Greenpark refused."8
effect on the income of owner-drivers, but because of its indirect effect on the job security
of the employee-drivers.
Likewise, in Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965),
the Court defined mandatory topics expansively in terms of the "vital interests" of employees.
Id. at 692 (White, J., speaking for three members of the Court). Jewel Tea Co. challenged
a collective bargaining provision that restricted the hours during which it could operate
its self-service meat department as a violation of federal antitrust law. It argued that,
while the hours which employees work is a mandatory subject, the hours which the employer
chooses to remain open (without using those employees' services) is not. Id. at 690. Justice
White found the provision valid because night marketing hours could affect the interests
even of butchers who worked only in the day. Their workloads might increase. Alternatively,
their job security might be impaired because some of their work could be done at night
by non-butchers.
Justice Goldberg, also speaking for two of his brethren, rejected even that approach
as "a narrow, confining view of what labor unions have a legitimate interest in preserv-
ing:' I& at 727. He contended that marketing hours would be a mandatory subject even
if they had no impact on Jewel Tea's butchers because those hours might affect the work-
ing conditions of union butchers at other markets in competition with Jewel. Id. at 728.
More recently, in Fort Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979), the Court affirmed the
Board's classification of the prices of in-plant food, supplied by a third party for on-premises
consumption by employees, as mandatory. The Court reasoned that conditions of employ-
ment must include "matters of deep concern to workers," id. at 498 (emphasis added), and
that the employees' "unsuccessful boycott" of the food service demonstrated this concern.
Id. at 501.
Conversely, in Allied Chem. Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971),
the Court found that benefits of retired employees were not mandatory subjects where
they did not vitally affect interests of present employees. Clearly, retired employees, like
the (possibly) independent contractors in Oliver, are not "employees" within the meaning
of the Act. Id. at 179. Nonetheless, the Court would have found their benefits mandatory,
had it agreed with the Board that these benefits "vitally affect" the benefits of present
employees. But the Court found such effects to be "speculative and insubstantial." Id. at
180-82.
"I The union was District 1199, National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees.
The election unit included only those FNM employees who performed maintenance work
at the Greenpark location. 452 U.S. at 669.
I8 Id. at 669-70.
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Thereafter, FNM simply ignored the union's written request to begin
collective bargaining. Three days before the contract was set to terminate,
FNM first notified its employees - and through them the union-of the clos-
ing. The union again demanded that FNM enter into collective bargaining,
this time about the decision to terminate its Greenpark operation and its
effects on the employees. The union proposed, inter alia, that FNM postpone
the closing until bargaining could take place."0 9
Contending that its decision to terminate was purely economic and that
extension of the contract for another thirty days would be "prohibitively
expensive," FNM refused to extend the contract or to bargain."' The union
filed charged under sections 8(a)(1) and (5).1
The administrative law judge found that the closing was economically
motivated."' Applying settled Board law, he concluded that bargaining was
109 Id.
..0 452 U.S. at 670. FNM's claim that postponing the closing for thirty days was too ex-
pensive is curious. Given the firm Board rule that an employer ordinarily had a duty to
bargain about such closings, see supra text accompanying notes 90-99, the probability that
the union would initiate a Board proceeding was very high. The attorney fees alone prom-
ised to far exceed the $1100 ($250 a week for a month) which FNM insisted would have
justified its continuation of the Greenpark contract.
Moreover, had FNM ultimately lost on the merits its back pay liability would have been
enormous. By the time the A.L.J. heard the case, approximately one year after the closing,
FNM's liability was estimated at $300,000. Record at 15, First Nat'l Maintenance. The poten-
tial liability increased as the case wended its way to the Board and the courts. See Fibreboard,
379 U.S. at 215-17; F.W. Woolworth, 90 N.L.R.B. 289 (1950).
Assuming, then, that FNM wished to make a rational, purely economic decision about
whether to bargain over the closing, it would have had to balance the $1,000 cost of re-
maining at Greenpark for another month against the potential attorney fees and back pay
liability from refusing to bargain. It would have discounted the risk of back pay liability
by the probability that the union would file no charge (unlikely), that the General Counsel
would issue no complaint (unlikely), that the Board would overrule its settled view or would
find that the closing fit one of its exceptions (unlikely), or that the Court of Appeals would
deny enforcement (likely), and that the Supreme Court would deny certiorari or disagree
with the Board (a crapshoot). But even to avoid liability, FNM was likely to have to spend
many thousands of dollars in attorney fees, far more than the probable costs of bargaining.
Therefore, FNM's explanation for its refusal to continue the contract for thirty days
strains credulity. If FNM received competent legal counsel and weighed the costs of bargain-
ing against the costs of refusal, its decision to close immediately is inexplicable.
11 452 U.S. at 670. No S 8(a)(3) charge was filed. Response of Samuel M. Kaynard, Regional
Director, to a Freedom of Information Act Request (February 4, 1982).
... FNM offered no objective proof that it was "losing money" on its Greenpark con-
tract. See discussion of proof of economic motivation, infra notes 288-91 and accompanying
text. It did offer unsubstantiated testimony that it had demanded a return to the higher
fee and that it was putting money out of its pocket. Record at 29, First Nat'l Maintenance.
On this basis, the judge found that the "Respondent was losing money on this job." 242
N.L.R.B. 462, 465 (1979). Since under Board law employer motivation was irrelevant in
a S 8(a)(5) case, the judge had no reason to devote attention to such a quibble. See supra
notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
The sequence of events raises a suspicion of anti-union motivation. FNM had accepted
the reduction in its fee for the five months prior to the election, apparently without com-
plaining. Record at 29. Even then, FNM waited until the Board certified the union before
notifying Greenpark that it was cancelling the contract. Moreover, by refusing to bargain
about the decision to close and its effects, FNM saved only $1,100, while it guaranteed
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mandatory. The Board affirmed."' Considering the issue for the first time
since Fibreboard,"4 the Second Circuit enforced the Board order on the
theory that employer decisions which necessarily lead to job termination
are presumed to be mandatory subjects of bargaining and that FNM had
not overcome this presumption by proving that bargaining would not have
promoted statutory purposes."5
In a Delphic opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court reversed.""
The Court summarized the rationale, the range, and the factors for its
balancing test in one cryptic passage:
[]n view of an employer's need for unencumbered decision making [the
rationale], bargaining over management decisions that have a substan-
tial impact on the continued availability of employment [the range]
should be required only if the benefit, for labor-management relations
and the collective bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on
the conduct of the business [the factors]. 117
Applying this test to economically motivated partial closing decisions, the
Court found that the cost of mandatory bargaining to employer autonomy
far exceeded the "incremental benefit" of union participation in the decision-
making process. " 8 Finally, the Court illustrated "the limits of [its] holding"
by pointing to facts in the case before it which had played no apparent part
in the creation or the application of the test. 9
The Court's opinion has mystified its critics. In his dissent Justice Bren-
nan criticized the majority's test as "fail[ing] to consider the legitimate
employment interests of the workers ... .""0 While agreeing with Justice
Brennan that the majority's test "left out the interests of the employees,"
one commentator argued that "in actually applying the test, the Court [had]
effectively balanced the interests of both parties by including employee in-
itself substantial legal fees and risked an enormous back pay award. See supra note 110.
The record is replete with hints that the Board attorney suspected, but could not prove,
antiunion motivation. See Record at 15, 16, 36, 44, 63.
113 242 N.L.R.B. 462 (1979).
1' In NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961), the court found that
an employer's transfer of work was not a mandatory subject.
", NLRB v. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1980).
111 First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
1,7 Id. at 679.
,8 Id. at 686. The Court carefully insisted that its holding on partial closing decisions
did not resolve the status of "other types of management decisions, such as plant reloca-
tions, sales, other kinds of subcontracting, automation, etc., which are to be considered
on their particular facts." 452 U.S. at 686 n.22. However, since these decisions clearly fit
the class of "management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued
availability of employment:' we may expect the Board and the courts of appeals to so
confine their consideration. Thus, First Nat'l Maintenance would totally replace Fibreboard,
which spoke to management decisions which "necessarily result" in job termination. See
supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
111 452 U.S. at 687.
L Id. at 688, 689 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
Marshall, ignored the majority's argument in favor of its test.
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terests in its assessment of the benefits to labor-management relations."12'
The commentator immediately reversed ground, however, by concluding
that this "effective balance" was flawed in that it "systematically under-
valued employee interests."'" Likewise, Professor Gould, in his masterful
survey of the Supreme Court's labor decisions in the 1980-81 term, found
the opinion "difficult to assess ... with any precision because so many
reasons were given... and some of them are in conflict with one another."'"
Because the opinion has generated such confusion, a careful explication of
the Court's meaning will enhance critical evaluation.
A. The Asymmetry of the Court's "Balancing" Test
The Court's test was asymmetrical in two distinct, but related ways.
First, the test, as articulated and as applied, counted the burden of man-
datory bargaining on management twice. Second, the test, as applied,
balanced the incremental benefit for labor against the total burden on
management. These asymmetries were consistent in that both discounted
employee interests.
1. Double Counting
The test called for a balancing not of employee/union interests against
employer interests, but rather of the benefits "for labor-management rela-
tions and the collective bargaining process" against the burden on
employers.124 What the Court meant by the "benefits for labor-management
relations" is puzzling. Justice Brennan dismissed the test as considering
"only the interests of management."125 But certainly the interests of
employees would be a factor in evaluating the "benefits to labor-
management relations."
The question is what, other than the interests of employees, entered into
that calculation. The phrase would ordinarily signify a balancing of
employee/union interests and management interests. If read this way, the
Court's test would then call for balancing the benefits to labor, minus the
burden on management, against the burden on management. If this is what
the Court meant, then its test "double counted" 26 the burden on manage-
121 The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 29, at 332-33 (emphasis added).
12 Id. at 333.
12 Gould, supra note 29, at 10.
12. 452 U.S. at 679.
12 Id. at 689.
1 The term is borrowed from cost-benefit analysis in which it refers to the plain error
of counting the same benefit or cost twice. E. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 78-80 (rev.
ed. 1976). Professor Mishan gave the following simple example:
[I]f the construction of a railroad from A to B raises the market value of those
houses that are situated near the new railroad station in A, these capital gains
are not to be brought separately into the calculation of benefits. The value
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ment. Although intuitively this seems implausible, the Court's actual
analysis of interests exemplifies double counting."
The Court recognized only two employee/union interests as legitimate:
protecting job security (which includes reducing the impact of closings that
do occur), and preventing antiunion closings, either total or partial.128 In
assessing labor's interest in job security, the Court reasoned that there
will be no benefit unless the union persuades management to remain open
by "offer[ing] concessions, information, and alternatives that might be
helpfui to management."" But since the union could do this even if bargain-
ing were merely permissive, "[i]t is unlikely.., that requiring bargaining
over the decision itself ... will augment this flow of information and
suggestions."'3 ° By counting as a legitimate benefit only cases in which the
union would offer helpful suggestions, the Court discounted those cases
in which the union might convince the employer to remain open by the
threat or actual use of its economic weapons.
The Court itself, however, has insisted that the use of economic weapons
is a legitimate part of the Act's scheme for collective bargaining. 3 ' The
Court's failure to count cases in which the union would succeed in pressur-
ing the employer to remain open as "benefits" of mandatory bargaining
therefore can be explained only on the ground that such cases would im-
permissibly "burden" labor-management relations and the collective
bargaining process. But when the Court evaluated management's interests
in the final portion of its test, it counted that same "burden" again.''
of such houses rises simply because, once the railroad is built, their occupants
have additional advantages either for job opportunities, shopping opportunities,
or outings. The estimate of these advantages already have [sic], or should have,
been entered into the cost-benefit analysis of the railroad on an annual basis.
Therefore to add their capital gains as well would amount to a clear case of
double-counting.
Id. at 79.
17 The difficulty of moving from an analysis that is theoretically quantifiable (economic
costs and benefits) to one that is not (judicial balancing of social interests) is considered
infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
12 452 U.S. at 681-82.
Id. at 681 (emphasis added).
Id.
"' The presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on
occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner
and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized. Abstract logical analysis might find
inconsistency between the command of the statute to negotiate toward an
agreement in good faith and the legitimacy of the use of economic weapons ....
But the truth of the matter is that at the present statutory stage of our na-
tional labor relations policy, the two factors-necessity for good-faith bargaining
between parties, and the availability of economic pressure devices to each
to make the other party inclined to agree on one's terms-exist side by side.
NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960).
'1 The Court said: "Labeling this type of decision mandatory could afford a union a power-
ful tool for achieving delay, a power that might be used to thwart management's inten-
tions in a manner unrelated to any feasible solution the union might propose." 452 U.S.
at 683 (emphasis added).
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This double counting of the burden on management is even clearer in
the Court's terse dismissal of the union's interest in preventing antiunion
closings. The Court stated that unions have "direct protection against a
partial closing decision that is motivated by an intent to harm a union.""
Certainly as to those rare antiunion closings in which the standard of proof
established by Darlington'34 can be met, the Court is correct.
Darlington, however, denied that all antiunion closings violate section
8(a)(3). The Court there recognized that the Board had already found, as
a fact, that "Darlington had been closed because of ... anti-union animus.
... "135 Nonetheless, the Court remanded the case to the Board for a finding
on whether the closing was "motivated by a purpose to chill unionism in
any of the remaining plants of the ... employer .... ,'3' The Court required
this extraordinary proof not because the union lacked legitimate interest
in preventing antiunion closings absent intent to chill elsewhere, but
because the Court wished to protect management "[i]n an area which
trenches so closely upon otherwise legitimate employer prerogatives." '137
As with the union's interest in job security, so too was its interest in "fair
treatment" explained away in First National Maintenance by weighing the
interests of management." Managerial interests were then double counted
by weighing them once again in calculating the burden on management.'39
2. Balancing Incremental Benefits Against Total Burdens
After balancing the employee interests (minus the employer interests)
against the employer interest, the Court "conclude[d] that the harm likely
to be done to an employer's need to operate freely in deciding whether to
shut down part of its business purely for economic reasons outweighs the
incremental benefit that might be gained through the union's participation
in making [that] decision."'O By so framing its conclusion, the Court revealed
the other asymmetry in its test: it balanced total harm to employers against
the incremental benefit for labor-management relations.
The use of the term "incremental" to describe the benefit may seem in-
significant. In balancing interests, whether in dollar terms as in economics,
or in the less precise terms of the law, one should count as the costs or
benefits of a particular decision or rule only such costs or benefits as are
" Id. at 682.
" See supra notes 79-84 and infra note 297.
380 U.S. at 267.
"' Id. at 275.
. Id. at 276.
"' 452 U.S. at 682-83.
In evaluating the burdens on management, the Court said, inter alia, "management
may have great need for speed, flexibility, and secrecy in meeting business opportunities
and exigencies." Id.
.. Id. at 686 (emphasis added).
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attributable thereto."' But the term "incremental" was not used to describe
the harm to management interests; nor, apparently, was the omission ac-
cidental. The Court consistently applied a marginal analysis to the benefits
of any union participation in the decision to close, while, just as consistently,
it failed to apply a marginal analysis to the harms to management
interests."'
The Court discounted labor's interest in job security by arguing that it
would be protected, in the absence of mandatory decision-bargaining, by
mandatory effects-bargaining and by permissive decision-bargaining. 4 ' And,
of course, the Court found labor's interest in avoiding antiunion closings
to be already "protected by section 8(a)(3)."'" In sum, the Court carefully
excluded from its balancing all benefits to labor that it believed would ac-
crue even in the absence of mandatory decision-bargaining. Yet, when the
Court considered management's interests, it did not limit itself to burdens
that were solely or inherently attributable to mandatory decision-
bargaining. Indeed, the marginal burden of decision-bargaining is
significantly less than the burden counted by the Court.
The Court first pointed to management's need for "speed, flexibility, and
secrecy."'45 But if, as the Court insisted, effects-bargaining "must be con-
ducted in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time,"'46 it is hard to
see what incremental harm mandatory decision-bargaining conducted at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner would cause to these
managerial interests.'4 7 Moreover, management's interest in speed and
secrecy could be protected by the application of sanctions for any breach
of the union's duty to bargain in good faith.'48
The Court also considered it a burden on management to require bargain-
ing where economic factors other than labor costs compel the closing and
render bargaining useless. It ignored the mitigation of this burden under
the Board cases which excused management from bargaining where
bargaining would be futile."'
"I What has become axiomatic was at one time revolutionary. See R. COLLISON, BLACK,
A. COATS & C. GOODWIN, THE MARGINAL REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS: INTERPRETATION AND
EVALUATION (1973); E. KAUDER, A HISTORY OF MARGINAL UTILITY THEORY (1965).
"I This asymmetry has, in part, been noted before. One commentator, for example, stated:
"[T]he majority measured the benefit to the union as the incremental benefit from adding
mandatory decision-bargaining to mandatory effects-bargaining, but measured the burden
on management without considering the burdens already imposed by mandatory effects-
bargaining." The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 29, at 333. But what the commen-
tator labelled "[t]his inconsistency," id., the Court applied consistently.
" 452 U.S. at 677 n.15.
1 Id- at 682.
45 Id
141 Id-
14 The Board had made that point long ago. Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 568-70
(1966). See also infra notes 343-44 and accompanying text.
,, Heinsz, supra note 29, at 110-11.
,, See cases cited supra note 95. Of course there would still be some burden on manage-
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Third, the Court pointed to the heavy burden on management from the
union's use of economic weapons to force it to keep a losing operation open."
But again, if effects-bargaining is mandatory, it is not clear that the in-
cremental burden of mandatory decision-bargaining would be great. In
either case the union could try to pressure management to accept an
uneconomic bargain. Indeed, the cost of severance pay or of transfer (in-
cluding moving expenses) could equal or exceed the losses from remaining
open.
Finally, the Court noted that even if an employer believed that it had
bargained over the decision to close, it would risk incurring sanctions if
the Board later determined that it had not bargained soon enough, long
enough (to impasse), or in good faith.15' Those same burdens, however, are
incident to effects-bargaining. 52
Thus, as bizarre as it may seem at first blush, the Court explicitly double
counted the burden on management and compared that gross burden to
the mere incremental benefit of decision-bargaining for the employees. In
sum, the Court's balancing test was not neutral, but rather was heavily
weighted in favor of managerial interests. This asymmetry was not,
however, a result of carelessness. Rather it was the carefully crafted out-
come of an extensive, but oblique, analysis of statutory purpose.
B. Justifying the Asymmetry in Terms of Statutory Purpose
As Professor Charles Fried noted long ago: "The analysis of rights into
interests ... has seemed to offer a liberating technique for looking behind
general and perhaps blind concepts ... to the realities of satisfying the
actual wants of actual people.le Certainly the analysis of interests in First
National Maintenance appears to be liberating when contrasted with the
Court's blind obeisance to the "management prerogatives" flag in
ment: e.g., those cases in which the Board fails to recognize that bargaining would, in fact,
have been futile. See discussion infra note 335 and accompanying text.
15 452 U.S. at 682.
... Id. at 685.
5 Indeed, they are incident to all applications of the requirement of good faith bargain-
ing. If employees strike, an employer is ordinarily entitled to hire permanent replacements.
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). If, however, employees strike to
protest an employer unfair labor practice, the employer may not permanently replace them.
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). Such strikers are entitled to back
pay from the date they apply for reinstatement. Yet the employer may remain in doubt,
and continue to accumulate liability, for years. See, e.g., NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418
F. 2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970).
" Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's Balancing
Test, 76 HARv. L. Ray. 755 (1963). See Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1943) ("There has been a notable shift throughout the world from thinking of the task
of the legal order as one of adjusting the exercise of free wills to one of satisfying wants ....
[W]e must start ... from a theory of interests .... ); and Jones, An Invitation to
Jurisprudence, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1030 (1974) ("compromise-the reasoned accommoda-
tion of opposed interests-is a central and indispensable technique in ... judicial resolution.").
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Darlington." Indeed, such deference "obscures rather than aids the search
for a meaningful limitation on management freedom.... [E]ven if one could
tell what a management prerogative is, this does not explain why other
statutory rights must yield to it."'1
But, as Professor Fried went on to contend, in balancing the interests
the Court should not beg the question by identifying elements that will
necessarily prejudice the outcome. This would be the situation if the Court
"balanced some highly generalized and obviously crucial interest.... against
some rather particular and narrowly conceived claim.""
How, then, might one defend the Court against the charge that it merely
begged the question? First, one might argue that judicial balancing is mere-
ly a metaphor. Since the Court was dealing with legal interests, not with
dollars or pounds, the talk of "double counting" and of comparing incremen-
tal to total impact is literalistic and misleading. Certainly, no matter how
one describes legal interests, the final decision as to "weight" is a matter
of subjective judgment, not of objective calibration. Yet the Court took its
own metaphor quite seriously; it not only stated the interests, but describ-
ed the scale on which those interests were balanced. The concepts of dou-
ble counting and of incremental or marginal analysis merely explain the
Court's own purported mode of analysis.57
Second, if the Court's conceptual scale must be followed, the question
is whether the Court was justified in placing its "thumb on the scale of
justice."'58 As Professor Barbara Underwood has explained, a host of legal
rules affecting the weighing of facts tell the fact-finder not only "how to
decide close cases [but also] when to regard a case as close." '159 The require-
ment in criminal cases that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt "in-
troduces a deliberate imbalance" to carry out the policy judgment "that
the costs of an erroneous conviction are far greater than the costs of an
erroneous acquittal."'60 This same type of policy judgment was implicit in
"' In Darlington the Court failed to explain how the proximity of "otherwise legitimate
employer prerogatives," 380 U.S. at 276 (emphasis added), could justify an almost insur-
mountable burden of proof protecting those prerogatives at the expense of the very employee
interest in self-organization which is the cornerstone of the Act.
"I Rabin, Limitations on Employer Independent Action, 27 VAND. L. REV. 133 (1974). See
H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 87 (1968) ("the theory is a modern day ra-
tionalization of the views of the judges in the conspiracy cases. As such, it has been re-
jected by the theories ... and the policy goals of the Labor-Management Relations Act.").
11 See Fried, supra note 153, at 763.
"1 Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930). In
addition, as Karl Llewellyn stated, the metaphor of interest balancing should not be lightly
discarded, for it "forces law on the attention as something man-made, something capable
of criticism, of change, of reform ... not only according to standards found inside law ...
but also according to standards vastly more vital found outside law .... Id. at 442.
"' Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal
Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299 (1977).
159 Id.
10 Id. at 1307.
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the Court's opinion in First National Maintenance. As a result, the Court
had to show that the costs of erroneously classifying decision-bargaining
as mandatory so exceed the costs of erroneously classifying it as permissive
as to justify the "deliberate imbalance" or asymmetry of its test. To do
this, the Court turned to statutory purpose.
In Fibreboard the Court had also grounded its decision on statutory pur-
pose. After noting that managerial decisions which necessarily result in
job termination fall within the plain meaning of the phrase "terms and con-
ditions of employment," the Court had reasoned that, since job security
was a matter of vital concern to employees, mandatory bargaining would
further "[o]ne of the primary purposes of the Act ... the peaceful settle-
ment of industrial disputes."16' But Fibreboard had hinted that there might
be some cases in which the impact of mandatory bargaining on employer
autonomy would be so great as to conflict with some other, unnamed
statutory purpose.
162
In First National Maintenance the Court built upon this foundation. It
did not deny that plant closings fit within the literal terms of the Act. It
did not deny that job security is of such vital interest to workers that in-
dustrial unrest might result from threats to such security. Instead, it denied
that the use of collective bargaining to achieve industrial peace was the
ultimate purpose of the Act"'3 and suggested that the Act's real purpose
is "to preserve the flow of interstate commerce.""' For the first time the
... 379 U.S. at 211. The Court refers to this both as "one of the primary purposes" and
as "the fundamental purpose." Id. Whether the Court meant that industrial peace was the
most important of the purposes is unclear.
162 Id. at 213-14.
16 Justice Stewart had suggested that line of argument in his Fibreboard concurrence:
The opinion of the court seems to assume that the only alternative to com-
pulsory collective bargaining is unremitting economic warfar6. But to exclude
subjects from the ambit of compulsory collective bargaining does not preclude
the parties from seeking negotiations about them on a permissive basis. And
there are limitations upon the use of economic force to compel concession upon
subjects which are only permissively bargainable. Labor Board v. Wooster
Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 221 n.6 (Stewart, J., concurring).
This is sheer sophistry. If the Court could secure industrial peace by an ex cathedra
declaration that a subject of vital concern to labor is not mandatory, then no subject need
be mandatory. It was precisely because the courts had failed to achieve either industrial
peace or industrial justice that Congress enacted first the Norris-LaGuardia Act and later
the NLRA itself.
Indeed such an argument would have been more difficult after the decision in Ford Motor
Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979), that in-plant food prices were a matter of such vital
concern to labor that the Board could classify them as mandatory to prevent "recurring
disputes ... [from] fester[ing] outside the negotiation process until strikes or other forms
of economic warfare occur." Id. at 499. The Court could hardly have contended that resent-
ment was more likely to fester over minor increases in in-plant food prices than over per-
manent termination of jobs.
' 452 U.S. at 674 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)).
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Court used statutory purpose to confine rather than to expand the
employees' voice in decisions directly affecting their vital concerns.16
To support this use of the Act, the Court argued that Congress em-
powered the Board, subject to judicial review, to fill in the interstices of
the Act so as to promote commerce. When Congress added section 8(d),
it authorized the Board to fix the limits of bargaining for that same end.
Therefore, the Board must look to the nexus between the subject and the
employer-employee relationship. First, if a subject only indirectly affects
employees (advertising, pension rights of retirees), there is no duty to
bargain. Presumably, to require bargaining over these subjects would in-
jure commerce. Second, if a subject is "almost exclusively" related to the
employment relationship (layoffs, work rules), it is automatically mandatory.
Third, if a subject "ha[s] a direct impact on employment .... but ha[s] as
its focus only... economic profitability," the determination is more com-
plex; it requires a careful parsing of the statutory schema.'66
The Court's reading of the statutory scheme is at the core of its argu-
ment for the asymmetrical balancing test.67 That reading may be translated
'15 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. Cf. Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW,
417 U.S. 790, 813 n.23 (1974) (dicta) (union strike to require that all foremen be union members
would violate § 8 (b)(1)(B), not § 8 (b)(3)).
10 452 U.S. at 677. The distinction between categories two and three is baffling. The
Court does not explain how it determined that management's focus in decisions on the
order of layoffs and on work rules is on the employer-employee relationship, but that its
focus in a partial closing is on profits.
When the Court devised its test of bargainability, see supra note 117 and accompanying
text, it defined the range of application in terms of whether the decision has "a substantial
impact on the continued availability of employment." It is not clear whether the Court
perceived this range as identical to the category of "profit focused" decisions. If it did,
then the distinction between category two and three is merely a variation of the view
which the Board expressed in its first Fibreboard opinion: a decision to terminate the employ-
ment of all employees in a bargaining unit is "not concerned with the conditions of employ-
ment of employees within an existing bargaining unit ... [but] rather ... [with] whether
the employment relationship still exists." 130 N.L.R.B. 1558, 1561 (1961). The deficiencies
of this distinction were explained supra note 61. Moreover, this distinction was rejected
both by the Board in its second Fibreboard decision, 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962) and by the
Supreme Court's affirmance of that decision. 379 U.S. 203 (1964). On the other hand, if
the Court meant that an employer has to prove that its decision was based solely on con-
cerns about profitability in order to fall within category three, then the Supreme Court's
rule would differ very little from that proposed by the Second Circuit in this very case.
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
IGI have numbered the following crucial propositions to facilitate reference.
[1] The aim of labeling a matter a mandatory subject of bargaining, rather
than simply permitting, but not requiring, bargaining, is to "promote the fun-
damental purpose of the Act by bringing a problem of vital concern to labor
and management within the framework established by Congress as most con-
ducive to industrial peace"....
[2] The concept of mandatory bargaining is premised on the belief that collec-
tive discussions backed by the parties' economic weapons will resulf in deci-
sions that are better for both management and labor and for society as a
whole....
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as follows. Congress' immediate intent or purpose in requiring collective
bargaining was to promote industrial peace. Therefore, matters of vital con-
cern to employees must ordinarily be categorized as mandatory.' But Con-
gress' "ulterior purpose"'6 9 was to promote commerce through "decisions
that are better for both management and labor and society as a whole."
Although Congress assumed that mandatory bargaining would usually
serve that ulterior purpose, it did not intend to extend the mandate where
the premise was false.170
Commerce requires profits, which in turn require decisive employer ac-
tion. A neutral, case-by-case balancing of interests would "constrain"
employers, undermine profits, and hinder commerce. 7' Therefore the test
of whether a subject is mandatory must be drawn to insulate managerial
[3] This will be true, however, only if the subject proposed for discussion is
amenable to resolution through the bargaining process. Management must be
free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent essential
for the running of a profitable business. It also must have some degree of
certainty beforehand as to when it may proceed to reach decisions without
fear of later evaluations labeling its conduct an unfair labor practice....
First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677-79 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
" Id. at 677-78.
1 R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 89 (1975). Professor
Dickerson distinguished "legislative intent" or the immediate objective of a statute from
"legislative purpose" or "ulterior purpose." Id.
Assuming that the Act's "ulterior purpose" is to promote commerce and that its im-
mediate objective is to achieve industrial peace, and assuming that these aims conflict in
relationship to mandatory decision-bargaining, which should control? Professor Dickerson
contended:
Much modern writing suggests the former. I suggest, instead, that the latter
should normally prevail. For one thing, there is little basis in experience for
assuming that a legislative purpose has been precisely and comprehensively
articulated. Even if it has, a legislative affirmation of purpose does not
guarantee that it has in fact been achieved in the working provisions of the
statute; the aspiration may remain at least partly unrealized. Its authors may
even have recognized and accepted the fact.
Id. at 98 (citation omitted).
The Court in First National Maintenance rejected Dickerson's modest conception of the
judicial role. The literature debating the nuances, the significance, and the ascertainability
of legislative intent and purpose is vast. See generally Landis, A Note on "Statutory Inter-
pretation," 43 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1980); MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754 (1966);
Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863 (1930); Note, supra note 66.
170 452 U.S. at 678.
171 Recall that employers faced the possibility of tremendous back pay liability if they
guessed wrong as to their duty to bargain over a closing. See supra note 110. Although
under the Board rule an employer was theoretically free to close in the face of an economic
emergency that rendered bargaining futile, it could never be certain whether the Board
would so view its circumstances. As a result, a rational employer might hesitate to take
decisive action necessary to protect its profitability. Compare Irving, supra note 29, at
226, who claims that even after First Nat'l Maintenance "[a]s a practical matter ... in all
but the clearest closing and sale cases, the employer must engage in decision-bargaining"
(citation omitted). Irving was complaining of what he perceived as an overly narrow con-
struction of the decision by the NLRB General Counsel. See infra note 387 and accompanying
text.
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freedom from uncertainty "to the extent essential for the running of a pro-
fitable business. 1
72
Thus, the Court's test, with its stress on "an employer's need for unen-
cumbered decision-making,"' 7 flows swiftly and logically from its rationale;
however, the justification for an asymmetrical balancing test rests on three
crucial propositions. First, Congress' ulterior purpose for the Act was to
promote commerce. Second, mandatory bargaining over plant closings, and
similar decisions, would hinder commerce more than would the industrial
unrest that might result from not so requiring. Third, the impact of plant
closings on employee free choice is either negligible or irrelevant. The next
section will examine the validity of these three propositions which form
the foundation of the Court's employer-protective test.
III. CRITIQUE: A FEARFUL ASYMMETRY
The crux of First National Maintenance, then, was not in the actual
weighing of interests, but in the calibration of the scale to fulfill statutory
purpose. The result of the "balancing" was preordained. The Court reasoned
that Congress had established the system of collective bargaining for the
"ulterior purpose" of promoting commerce. A rule which caused manage-
ment to hesitate before making economically desirable closing decisions
would tend to undermine the profitability necessary to commerce.
Therefore, the scale had to be weighted heavily in favor of managerial
freedom to make such decisions.
This argument, while superficially persuasive, suffers crucial flaws. First,
the NLRA reflects a congressional judgment that employee free choice is
necessary to long-run economic health. In the reality of labor-management
relations, employer decisions concerning job termination can be insulated
only at serious risk to employee free choice. Therefore, a construction of
the Act which systematically subordinates employee free choice to employer
profitability will frustrate the statutory purpose. On the other hand, con-
structions of the Act which protect employee free choice would injure some
employers; but these alternatives would not systematically destroy pro-
fitability. Additionally, since Congress specifically delegated to the Board
the task of defining the scope of mandatory bargaining, the Court erred
in substituting its own judgment for the Board's "reasonably defensible"''
construction.
112 452 U.S. at 678-79.
123 [I]1 view of an employer's need for unencumbered decisionmaking, bargaining
over management decisions that have a substantial impact on'the continued
availability of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-
management relations and the collective bargaining process, outweighs the
burden placed on the conduct of the business.
452 U.S. at 679 (emphasis added).
174 Ford Motor Co., v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979).
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A. Congressional Purpose and Statutory Structure
Historical context, statutory language, and some precedent support the
Court's inference that promoting commerce was a major aim of the
statute."' Section one of the Wagner Act recounted Congress' findings that
labor unrest, inequality of bargaining power, and lack of associational
freedom had obstructed commerce and "aggravate[d] recurrent business
depressions." '17 The Taft-Hartley Act added further support. "It is the pur-
pose and policy of this [Act], in order to promote the fulUflow of commerce,
to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers." '177
Moreover, the First NationalMaintenance reading of statutory purpose,
if correct, would provide a rationale for two major lines of Supreme Court
cases whose basis has until now remained a mystery.' In the first line of
cases, the Court categorized as "unprotected" employee concerted activities
which fall within the plain meaning of section 7, further employee interests,
and violate no other legal proscriptions.' It has offered no statutory
justification for this exclusion. As one noted scholar put it:
The Board and the courts have over time developed a "common law"
under section 7.... Although the development ... is not altogether
without statutory inspiration .... [some] decisions ... go rather far
toward condemning concerted activities as unprotected simply because
they are thought to be vaguely "unfair" or to impose "undue" pressures
upon the employer. Exactly, what makes these pressures so, and what
gives the Board or the courts authority to declare them unprotected by
section 7, is articulated rarely if at all.8 '
NRLB v. Local 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co.) s1 ex-
emplifies this first line of cases. Frustrated by drawn out negotiations in
which their employer had rejected so basic a union demand as arbitration
of individual discharges, unionized employees distributed handbills impugn-
ing the quality of the employer's product, which was television
programming. Distributing handbills to solicit consumer pressure on an
employer clearly fits the requirements for section 7 protection. Further-
more, the handbills were not defamatory or otherwise illegal. Yet the Court
1 Congress passed the Wagner Act in the midst of the Great Depression. Senator Wagner
himself "emphasized ... that the right of workers to organize ... was thought necessary
as a basis for a sound economy." H. MILIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-
HARTLEY 27 (1950).
178 Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. S 151
(1976)).
177 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, S 1, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.
S 141 (1976) (emphasis added).
17' Barron, supra note 14, is the most recent attempt to solve this puzzle. See also Get-
man, supra note 14.
"7 See infra text accompanying notes 181-84.
ISO R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 302
(1976) (emphasis added).
18 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
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both upheld the employer's discharge of the employees and found the
employee distribution "unprotected" because it was "disloyal." '182
The Court did not explain the statutory significance of labeling the acts
"disloyal" except to note "the importance of enforcing industrial plant
discipline and of maintaining loyalty as well as the rights of concerted
activities.""I "Plant discipline and ... loyalty" are, of course, important
to the employer, as would be the clearly proscribed power to discharge in-
dividual pro-union employees in order to prevent unionization. The ques-
tion remained: why are they so important to the purposes of the Act as to
justify discharging employees who engage in concerted activities in sup-
port of collective bargaining demands?
Facing this question squarely, Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, rejected
the notion that the decision promoted the statutory purpose:
Section 10(c) does not speak of discharge "for disloyalty". If Congress
had so written that section, it would have overturned much of the law
that had been developed by the Board and the courts in the twelve years
preceding the Taft-Hartley Act. The legislative history makes clear that
Congress had no such purpose.... Many of the legally recognized tac-
tics and weapons of labor would readily be condemned for "disloyalty"
were they employed between man and man in friendly personal
relations."
In light of First National Maintenance, the Court's emphasis on main-
taining "discipline and ... loyalty" can be explained: they are necessary
to commerce. The majority in Jefferson Standard emphasized that the
employees had not disclosed in their handbills that they sought the public's
support in a labor dispute with their employer. Hence, if the decision is
read to require only disclosure to gain protection, it would not substan-
tially chill employee section 7 activity.
In the second line of cases, the Court recognized, i.e. created, an implied
employer privilege to respond to employees' protected concerted activity
in ways that effectively penalize the employees. This privilege obtains
where the employer offers "legitimate and substantial business justifica-
tions" and is not (or is not proven to have been) motivated by antiunion
animus.1" Again, the Court has never explained the statutory basis for this
doctrine.186 As another scholar put it in commenting on the first and most
18 Hence, the discharge was "for cause." See NLRA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976).
' 346 U.S. at 474 (emphasis added).
1 Id. at 479-80.
' NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967). See generally Barron, supra
note 14.
181 The mystery has been not only in the rationale, but also in the approach to these
cases. Whether an employer who proves business justification is privileged absent proof
of illicit motive or whether employer and employee interests are to be weighed is a ques-
tion on which the Court has, to put it kindly, wavered. Compare NLRB v. Mackay Radio
& Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (dicta) (privileged); with NLRB v. Erie Resistor Co., 373
U.S. 221 (1963) (weighed); with NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967) (weighed
or privileged depending on impact on employee rights).
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important case in this line: "[N]o one has ever made an effort to justify the
underlying legal premise of[the decision] that the employer must be given
an opportunity to continue his business even at the expense of his striking
employees who are exercising rights guaranteed protection by the
statute." '187
The First National Maintenance view of statutory purpose can also ra-
tionalize the "employer privilege" cases. For example, in Republic Avia-
tion Corp. v. NLRB,188 the Supreme Court in general terms approved the
Board's presumptions concerning employer rules limiting employee solicita-
tion of fellow employees at the work place. Under those presumptions, a
rule forbidding solicitation during non-working hours is presumed to be
an unfair labor practice; but a rule forbidding solicitation during working
hours is presumed to be proper.189 Yet clearly, employee solicitation dur-
ing working hours is no less an instance, in section 7 terms, of "form[ing],
join[ing], or assist[ing]" a union than is solicitation during non-working hours.
Although in Republic Aviation itself the Court did not articulate a basis
for distinguishing these situations, in a later case it explained that "[n]o
restriction may be placed on the employees' right to discuss self-
organization among themselves, unless the employer can demonstrate that
a restriction is necessary to maintain production or discipline."9 '
Under First National Maintenance this implied employer privilege to con-
strain employee-protected activity can be explained. So long as employees
are free to solicit for a union at the job during non-working hours, a neutral
worktime prohibition will neither substantially impede efforts to reach
fellow employees, nor broadly chill employee free choice. On the other hand,
were management forbidden to enforce such a rule, discipline, production,
profits, and ultimately commerce might suffer severely.
In sum, historical context, language, and precedent support the view that
18 Schatski, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning afMisnomer-"Protected" Con-
certed Activities, 47 Tsx. L. REV. 378,388-89 (1969). Professor Schatski was referring to NLRB
v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) in which the Court, in dicta, stated that
an employer has a right to permanently replace striking employees so long as it does not
discriminate against union adherents in deciding who has been replaced. The Mackay "rule"
has been subject to serious criticism. See, e.g., id.; Note, Replacement of Workers During
Strikes, 75 YALE L.J. 630 (1966). Furthermore, it appears to be inconsistent with later Supreme
Court decisions. Cf., e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) (grant of
superseniority to replacements illegal even if necessary to induce them); NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967). (Consider the following questions: why is perma-
nent replacement not "inherently destructive?" Why does an employer have a "legitimate
and substantial" justification for permanently replacing strikers if temporary replacements
are available?) Nonetheless, it remains accepted law.
324 U.S. 793 (1945).
18 The continuing "evolution" of the Board's presumptions does not affect this analysis.
See, e.g., Essex Int'l, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. 749 (1974) (work time rule proper), T.R.W., Inc.,
257 N.L.R.B. 442 (1981) (work time rule overbroad and improper); Intermedics, Inc., 262
N.L.R.B. No. 178, 110 L.R.R.M. 1441 (1982) (Van de Water and Hunter, JJ., concurring and
dissenting).
19 NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956) (emphasis added).
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promoting commerce is an important purpose of the Act. Therefore, a con-
struction of the Act which promotes commerce but does not substantially
impinge on employee section 7 rights is certainly proper.'91 However, a rule
which insulates employer autonomy in making economically-motivated plant
closing decisions does so at substantial cost to employee free choice. 9'
Therefore, the Court had to clear a higher hurdle to justify its test.
To return to Professor Underwood's metaphor of the "thumb on the scale
of justice,' '9 3 no one would argue that innocents should be convicted of
crimes. To justify requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal
cases, one must find that, under any lesser standard of proof, the risks of
wrongful conviction exceed the risks of freeing the guilty. Similarly, to
justify protecting employer autonomy (and profit) at the expense of
employee free choice, the Court in First National Maintenance had to show:
(1) that Congress intended generally to subordinate employee rights to
employer profitability; or (2) that Congress intended specifically that sec-
tions 8(b)(3) and 8(d) be construed to limit bargaining on matters of vital
concern to employees where profitability is at stake; or (3) that the "ulterior
purpose" of the Act requires that the systematic risks to employer
profitability from mandatory decision-bargaining (an employee-protective
test) be weighed against the systematic risks to employee free choice from
a rule protecting employer autonomy (an employer-protective test), and that
the former outweigh the latter.
The following argument shows that the first and second choices are false
and that the third correctly describes the task that the Court should have
faced.' Section B argues that in reality an employer-protective test poses
far greater risks to employee free choice than an employee-protective test
poses for employer profitability.
1. Employee Free Choice, Employer Profitability, and the
General Intent of Congress
"[E]ven a dog," said Justice Holmes, "distinguishes between being
Il This is the easy case; for it is hard to argue against "[a] change ... [which] makes
at least one person better off and no one worse off." R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE
54 (1981). Such a change is called "Pareto superior:' But a change is not Pareto superior
if it makes anyone worse off, even in a minor way. The change may, nonetheless be "effi-
cient"; i.e., it may "maximizle] the total quantity of" satisfaction. B. ACKERMAN, ECONOMIC
FOUNDATION OF PROPERTY LAW xiii (1975). The rules in Republic Aviation and in Jefferson Stan-
dard are not truly Pareto superior to their contraries (both make employees somewhat
worse off); but they are very likely more efficient. Efficiency alone, however, does notjustify a choice.
19 See discussion infra notes 287-327 and accompanying text.
1 Supra note 158.
"u Either the first or second choice, if it were correct, would support the Court's asym-
metrical test. The third would replace it with a neutral test that might, nonetheless, justify
its specific holding that economically motivated partial closing decisions are not mandatory
subjects of bargaining.
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stumbled over and being kicked."'95 Congress clearly meant to "kick"
employers, for it protected employee free choice despite the inevitable risk
to the profitability of individual employers. Indeed, the Act does nothing
if it does not protect employee rights by limiting the pre-existing rights
of employers to act unilaterally in pursuit of profit.
The Act expressly protects employee rights to picket, to strike, and to
boycott in support of organization, recognition, and collective bargaining.'"
By increasing union bargaining power with respect to wages, working con-
ditions, plant discipline, and a host of other matters, the Act necessarily
reduces managerial freedom to make decisions to maximize profitability.
As Dean Wellington put it: "[I]f the essence of managerial function is
decision-making plain and simple, then management functions are impaired
when the scope of collective bargaining is increased. In fact, they are im-
paired when there is collective bargaining over any subject at all." '197
Although the decrease in managerial freedom necessarily threatens the
profitability of some employers, this is a risk that Congress knowingly and
intentionally took. Consider, for example, wage bargaining. Unions have
long sought to free wages from the vicissitudes of competition.' But
industry-wide wage scales inherently threaten the profitability- and hence
the survival-of relatively inefficient employers. Yet the Court has
recognized the validity of this union objective:
[A] union may adopt a uniform wage policy and seek vigorously to im-
plement it even though it may suspect that some employers cannot ef-
fectively compete if they are required to pay the wage scale demanded
by the union. The union need not gear its wage demands to wages which
the weakest units in the industry can afford to pay.'99
195 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 7 (1881).
The original Wagner Act, in fact, placed no express limitations on these employee
activities. Furthermore, it pre-empted most state regulation thereof. See e.g. Local 24, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959); UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 258 (1949); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945). The relevance
of the express limitations on union activities added by Taft-Hartley is discussed infra notes
214-48 and accompanying text.
' H. WELLINGTON, supra note 155, at 87.
"' See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), in which the union
sought to force the employer to accede to the industry-wide pattern to protect its wages
and working conditions in relationship to other employers. See discussion infra notes 230-33
and accompanying text.
'9 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665 n.2 (1965) (emphasis added)
(holding that such an objective would nonetheless violate the Sherman Act if promoted
by an agreement with some employers aimed at destroying others). The Taft-Hartley Act
placed some limitations on the means that unions may use to achieve this objective, but
did not make the purpose itself illegal. NLRA §§ 8(b)(4) and (7), 29 U.S.C. §5 158(b)(4) and
(7) (1976). The Board has recognized the propriety of the objective in various circumstances.
See, e.g., Teamsters Local 301, 210 N.L.R.B. 783 (1974) ("take it or leave it" bargaining
with economically distressed employer); Houston Bldg. Trades Council (Claude Everett Con-
struction Co.), 136 N.L.R.B. 321 (1962) ("area wage standards" picketing). Cf. NLRB v. General
Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 768-69 (1969) (Friendly, J., dissenting, approved union take it or
leave it bargaining in face of employer loss).
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More recently, in NLRB v. International Longshoreman's Association,"'
the Court dealt with a conflict between employee interest in job security
and employer interest in profitability. Technological innovation which per-
mitted containerization of cargo in the shipping industry was "substantial-
ly more economical than traditional methods,"' ' at least in part because
it reduced work to be performed by longshoremen at shipside. Responding
to this threat to its members' jobs, the union bargained for rules which
forbade the loading of containers by non-ILA employees of local truckers
and freight consolidators. Under the collective bargaining agreement, ship-
ping companies which supplied containers for such use were subject to fines.
When some companies were so fined, they refused to continue providing
containers for the consolidators.
Although these rules clearly reduced both the profitability of the con-
solidators and the general efficiency of commerce, the Court found them
legal under the Act. It reasoned that "the legality of a thoroughly bargain-
ed and apparently reasonable accommodation to technological change..
. [depends] not [on] whether the Rules represent the most rational or effi-
cient response to innovation, but [on] whether they are a legally permissi-
ble effort to preserve jobs.""n In so deciding, the Court recognized that
agreements to preserve work- which are based on the very employee in-
terest in job security that is involved in decision-bargaining over plant
closings -are consistent with the purposes of the Act, even when they lead
to clearly inefficient results. Accordingly, the Court has long recognized
that Congress did not intend, as a general rule, to sacrifice employee sec-
tion 7 rights whenever their exercise conflicted with individual employer
profitability.
2. Sections 8(b)(3) and 8(d) as Specific Limitations
In support of the First National Maintenance scale, one might also argue
more narrowly that Congress meant the specific proscriptions of section
8(b), the union unfair labor practice provisions, to protect employer interests
even at the expense of employee section 7 rights. 3 Section 8(b)(3), of course,
447 U.S. 490 (1980).
21 Id. at 494. The Court went on to catalogue the efficiencies:
Because cargo does not have to be handled and repacked as it moves from
the warehouse by truck to the dock, into the vessel, then from the vessel
to the dock and by truck or rail to its destination, the costs of handling are
significantly reduced. Expenses of separate export packaging, storage, losses
from pilferage and breakage, and costs of insurance and processing cargo
documents may also be decreased. Perhaps most significantly, a container ship
can be loaded or unloaded in a fraction of the time required for a conventional
ship.
Id. at 494-95 (citation omitted).
Id. at 511.
The Court's argument could be so read. It said: "Despite the deliberate open-endedness
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forbids a union "to refuse to bargain collectively." Accepting for the mo-
ment that a union's insistence on bargaining over a non-mandatory sub-
ject is a constructive refusal to bargain,"4 it might then be reasonable to
construe the subjects of bargaining under section 8(d) to protect employer
profits at the expense of employee free choice. This argument, however,
founders in legislative history as well as in precedent.
a. The Requirement of Specificity. Congress expected and intended the
provisions of section 8(b) to be narrowly construed. In the years preceding
the consideration and adoption of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Supreme Court
had recognized that employee concerted activities were entitled to some
degree of first amendment protection. Hence, it had proclaimed that in order
to restrict picketing, there must be a "clear and present danger of destruc-
tion of life or property, or invasion of the right of privacy, or breach of
the peace ' and the statute must be "narrowly drawn to cover the precise
situation giving rise to the danger.""2 ' Congress recognized and adopted
the Court's narrow reading of restrictions on peaceful union activity in sec-
tion 13 of the Taft-Hartley Act: "Nothing ... [in the NLRA], except as
specifically provided for herein, shall be construed sols either to interfere
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the
limitations or qualifications on that right.""2 7
of the statutory language, there is an undeniable limit to the subjects about which bargaining
must take place .... First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676 (1981).
This is considerably toned down from Justice Stewart's rhetoric in his Fibreboard concur-
rence where he wrote: "It is important to note that the words of the statute are words
of limitation." Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. at 220 (Stewart, J., con-
curring) (emphasis added). The question that neither the First Nat'l Maintenance Court
nor Justice Stewart in his Fibreboard concurrence faced is whether the statutory words
were "words of limitation" sufficiently express to meet the specificity requirement of S
13 of the Act.
The provisions of S 8(b) vary greatly. Some clearly were designed to protect employers.
See, e.g., NLRA S 8(b(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(4)(B) (1976) (secondary boycott provision). Others
were drafted mainly to protect the employee S 7 right to refrain from concerted activities.
See, e.g., NLRA S 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. 5 158(b)(1)(A) (1976) (coercion provision). Still others
were aimed to protect either employees or employers or both from union over-reaching.
See, e.g., NLRA S§ 8(b)(4)(C) and 8(b)(7)(A), (B) & (C), 29 U.S.C. SS 158(bX4)(C) and 158(b(7}(A),
(B) & (C) (1976) (the organizational, recognitional picketing provisions).
"' This proposition has been accepted as if it had been decided since NLRB v. Wooster
Div. of Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342 (1958), where it was never so stated by the majority,
but was hinted by the dissent to be a necessary consequence of the majority's holding
that employer insistence was a constructive refusal to bargain. Id. at 359 (Harlan, J., dis-
senting). See discussion infra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
" Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940).
Id.; see also Carpenters Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942); Bakery Drivers
Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
29 U.S.C. S 163 (1976) (emphasis added). Thornhill supra note 205, and Ritters Cafe,
supra note 206, are among the cases explicitly referred to only once in the congressional
debates on Taft-Hartley. Remarks of Representative Clifford Case, 93 CONG. REC. A1007
(1947), reprinted in I LEG. HIST. LMRA, supra note 54, at 580-81. But other allusions thereto
are clear.
The Hartley Bill included a much broader proscription on concerted activities than did
the final Taft-Hartley Act. See S 12 of the Hartley Bill, H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. 1st Sess.
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The Supreme Court, in turn, has followed the command of section 13,
even where the arguments for an expansive reading of section 8(b) were
far more compelling than they were in First National Maintenance. For
example, inNLRB v. Drivers Local No. 639 (Curtis Bros.),"° the Court found
section 8(bM)(A), which prohibits union coercion of employees in the exer-
cise of their section 7 rights, not suffiwiently particular to proscribe a union's
recognitional picketing against an employer whose employees had just
voted overwhelmingly against union representation. The employer could
not have recognized the union without itself violating either section 8(a)(2)
of the Act, which forbids employer "dominat[ion] or interfere[ince]" with
a union," or section 8(a)(3), which forbids employer "discrimination... to
encourage ... [union] membership.""21 If the picketing were effective, the
employer would have been forced to choose between suffering business
losses and violating its employees' right to refrain from unionization.
Despite these compelling facts, the Court construed section 13 as "a com-
mand of Congress to the courts to resolve doubts and ambiguities in favor
of an interpretation.., which safeguards the right to strike... ,"I" The
Court went on to say that "[i]n the sensitive area of peaceful picketing Con-
gress has dealt explicitly with isolated evils which experience has established
flow from such picketing. Therefore, unless there is the clearest indication
in the legislative history of section 8(b)(1)(A) .... we cannot sustain the
Board's order here."2 ' The Supreme Court has consistently followed the
Curtis Bros. approach to the construction of section 8(b).213
(1947), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. LMRA, supra note 54, at 31. For this the Hartley Bill was
criticized as going "far beyond the evils which need remedial action." H.R. 245, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1947) (minority report), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. LMRA, supra note 54, at 292,386.
The House-Senate conference committee rejected § 12 of the Hartley Bill and adopted
S 13 in its present form. Reporting these results to the Senate, Senator Taft himself stated:
"The conferees rejected the broad prohibition of all kinds of strikes .... The only strikes
which are declared to be illegal are secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes .... In that
respect the House accepted entirely the provisions of the Senate bill:' 93 CONG. REC.
6445-46, reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST. LMRA, supra note 54, at 1544 (emphasis added).
Il 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976). See International Ladies Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB
(Bernhardt-Altmann Texas Corp.), 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
210 29 U.S.C. 5 158(a)(3) (1976). See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
211 Curtis Bros., 362 U.S. at 282.
212 Id. at 284 (emphasis added).
The facts of Curtis Bros. would now be governed by the more narrowly focused language
of § 8(b)(7)(B), which proscribes recognitional picketing for one year after a valid election.
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, § 704(c), Pub.
L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519, 541 (amending the NLRA) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976)).
Even that narrow language might fail to reach picketing in support of area standards.
Cf. Houston Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Claude Everett Constr. Co.), 136 N.L.R.B.
321 (1962) ("area standards" picketing not proscribed under 5 8(b)(7}(C)).
2 3 In NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960), the Court assumed
that a job slowdown to pressure the employer in collective bargaining was not protected
by § 7. Nonetheless, it refused to affirm the Board's treatment of this as a "constructive
refusal to bargain" under § 8(b)(3); the Court explained that "the activities here involved
have never been specifically outlawed by Congress.... ITJhe Board needs a more specific
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b. The Taft-Hartley "Limitations." Neither section 8(b)(3) nor section 8(d)
can be understood, in terms of section 13, "as specifically provid[ing]for"
the prohibition of strikes or picketing over plant closings. Nor does the
legislative history, in the words of Curtis Bros., give "the clearest indica-
tion" that Congress so intended. In fact, the statutory language and its
legislative history show that Congress considered and rejected both a
restrictive view of the proper topics of collective bargaining and a proscrip-
tion on union bargaining over non-mandatory topics.
The drafters of the original Hartley Bill2" were concerned with the "liber-
ties the Board has taken with the term "collective bargaining" due to the
absence from the present act of language defining the scope of
bargaining." '215 Hence, the Bill defined "collective bargaining" as
not ... requiring that either party... discuss any subject matter other
than the following: (i)... wage rates, hours of employment, and work
requirements; (ii) procedures and practices relating to discharge, suspen-
sion, lay-off, recall, seniority, and discipline, or to promotion, demotion,
transfer and assignment within the bargaining unit; (iii) conditions, pro-
cedures, and practices governing safety, sanitation, and protection of
health at the place of employment; (iv) vacations and leaves of absence;
and (v) administrative and procedural provisions relating to the forego-
ing subjects. 6
Furthermore, the Bill would have made employee or union use of economic
weapons to gain an employer's agreement on any other subject an unfair
labor practice. 17
Had Congress enacted those provisions, the specificity requirement of
section 13 would have been met; but it rejected both. 8 Instead, it defined
charter than S 8(b)(3) before it can add to the Act's prohibitions here." Id. at 498-99 (cita-
tion omitted) (emphasis added). See also NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S.
665, 672-73 (1951). But cf. NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, 434 U.S. 335, 355 (1978) (in light
of 5 13, dissent argued that S 8(b)(7) was insufficiently particular to outlaw union picketing
in support of a lawful prehire agreement).
-" H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) [hereinafter cited as Hartley Bill], reprinted
in 1 LEG. HIST. LMRA, supra note 54, at 31-98.
215 H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. LMRA, supra
note 54, at 313. See id. at 310-12.
218 Hartley Bill, supra note 214, S 2(11), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. LMRA, supra note 54,
at 39-40. The First Nat'l Maintenance Court referred to this provision, 452 U.S. at 675,
n.14, but did not consider its significance in light of S 13 of the Act.
217 The Bill specifically forbade any employee or union
to call, authorize, engage in, or assist any strike or other concerted interference
with an employer's operations, an object of which is to compel the employer
to accede to the inclusion in a collective bargaining agreement of any provi-
sion which under section ... 2(11) is not included as a proper subject matter
of collective bargaining.
Hartley Bill, supra note 214, S 8(b)(3), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST.LMRA, supra note 54, at 52.
218 Congress' rejection of these specific provisions of the Hartley Bill demonstrates the
error in the Borg-Warner dictum, which stated that a union's insistence on a non-mandatory
topic violates S 8(b)(3). Because Borg-Warner involved insistence by an employer rather
than by a union, the Court did not assess the significance of S 13 of the Act, nor of the
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the scope of bargaining through use of the phrase, "terms and conditions
of employment," language which had historically been used to recognize
the breadth of labor's legitimate interests. The phrase "terms and condi-
tions of employment" is rooted in the reaction to judicial repression of
unionization under both the common law and federal antitrust law.
An example of such repression was the common law "illegal purpose"
doctrine which was used to confine the scope of legitimate union interests.219
In Carew v. Rutherford,"0 a union struck for a "work preservation"
objective." The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found this tortious,
on the ground that the purpose was illegal, despite the vital employee
interest.' And in Plant v. Woodsm that same court found illegal a strike
threat directed at achieving a union shop, despite the vital employee con-
cern with unified organization and representation. 4
Likewise, the federal courts used the Sherman Antitrust Act, to restrict
the ambit of union activity." In Loewe v. Lawlor (The Danbury Hatters'
Case),' the Court held the union's recognitional boycott, designed to achieve
industry-wide acceptance of the union scale and working conditions, to be
an illegal restraint of trade."8
Congress first used the phrase "terms and conditions of employment"
legislative rejection of § 2(11) and 8(b)(3) of the Hartley Bill, nor of the history of the
phrase "terms and conditions of employment." Instead, it casually assumed that since 5
8(d)'s definition of "to bargain collectively" applies both to S 8(a)(5) and S 8(b)(3), the same
consequences must attach to insistence on a non-mandatory subject whether by an employer
or by a union.
Although the Court has never squarely faced this issue, its dictum has become so en-
trenched that a contrary holding now seems unlikely. See supra notes 19 & 49 and accom-
panying text.
219 See C. GREGORY, supra note 2, at 53-76.
106 Mass. 1 (1870).
' The facts mirror those in NLRB v. International Longshoreman's Ass'n., 447 U.S.
490 (1980), in which the Supreme Court found labor's work preservation objective legal
under the NLRA. See discussion, supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
The Court said: "Every man has a right to determine what branch of business he
will pursue .... And it is no crime for any number of persons, without an unlawful object
in view, to ... agree that they will not ... work under a certain price, or without certain
conditions." 106 Mass. at 14 (emphasis added).
176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900).
Justice Holmes, in a prescient dissent, wrote:
I differ from my Brethren in thinking that the threats [to boycott and to strike]
were as lawful for this preliminary purpose [the union shop] as for the final
one to which strengthening the union was a means. I think that unity of
organization is necessary to make the contest of labor effectual ....
Id. at 505, 57 N.E. at 1016.
15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1976).
2 See C. GREGORY, supra note 2, at 200-22.
208 U.S. 274 (1908).
Under the NLRA picketing to encourage a consumer boycott is protected so long
as it is limited to the "struck product" which does not comprise the whole business of
a secondary employer. NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964);
NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title Insurance Co.), 447 U.S.
607 (1980).
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in attempting to overrule The Danbury Hatters' Case. In section 20 of the
Clayton Antitrust Act, Congress denied federal courts the power to issue
injunctions "in any case between an employer and employees ... growing
out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment.'" Although
Congress clearly had intended the phrase to define the legitimate concerns
of unions broadly, the Court read this protection narrowly in Duplex Print-
ing Press Co. v. Deering.' Like The Danbury Hatters' Case, Duplex involved
a boycott designed to protect the union wage scale from cheap non-union
competition. The Court found the boycott unprotected because the
"employees" engaged therein were not "employees of the employer" be-
ing boycotted.231
In a stinging dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that "the contest ... in-
volves vitally the interest of every person whose co-operation is sought."'232
This was the first judicial hint that the phrase "terms and conditions of
employment" should be understood as covering all matters of vital concern
to employees.'
Congress approved Justice Brandeis' view in the Norris-LaGuardia Act.'
That Act deprived the federal courts of equity jurisdiction in "labor
dispute[s]," which it broadly defined in section 13(c) as including "any con-
troversy concerning terms or conditions of employment ... whether or not
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.""
In the years preceding the adoption of the phrase in section 8(d) of the Taft-
Hartley Act, the Court construed section 13(c) of Norris-LaGuardia broadly
to protect all labor actions to secure employee interests," so long as "the
employer-employee relationship was the matrix of the controversy."' 7 In
fact, the Supreme Court only last term summarized the meaning of those
cases: "Our decisions have recognized that the term "labor dispute" must
not be narrowly construed because the statutory definition itself is extreme-
ly broad .. ,"2-8
15 U.S.C. S 20 (1976) (emphasis added).
= 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
21 Duplex differed from The Danbury Hatters' Case in that it involved a boycott by
employees rather than by consumers of secondary employers. Such a boycott is now pro-
scribed by the NLRA. See NLRA S 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. S 8(b)(4)(B) (1976).
254 U.S. at 481.
Although Justice Brandeis used this language specifically in rejecting the common
law illegal purpose doctrine, he implied that a similar standard should be employed in con-
struing the protection of S 20 of the Clayton Act. Id. at 483-88.
Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. SS 101-15 (1976).
29 U.S.C. S 113(c) (1976). (Specific reference or context will be used to distinguish
S 13(c) of Norris-LaGuardia from S 13 of the NLRA as amended in Taft-Hartley.)
m Lauf v. E.G. Shiner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery
Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938); Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, Local 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prods.,
311 U.S. 91 (1940); U.S. v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
' Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 147 (1942). See also Allen Bradley
Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
' Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. International Longshoreman's Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 2673,
2680-81 (1982) (emphasis added).
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Subsequent to the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the phrase
was incorporated in the Wagner Act, both to define labor disputes and to
establish the area of exclusive power of the majority union., 9 Nothing in
the legislative history of the Wagner Act suggests that Congress intended
"terms and conditions of employment" to carry a narrower meaning than
it had in Norris-LaGuardia, or that Congress was using the phrase to con-
fine rather than to expand the area of legitimate and (where there is a ma-
jority representative) exclusive union concern.
Thus, when Congress replaced the Hartley Bill's narrow list of subjects
with the phrase "terms and conditions of employment," it imported a history
of broad construction. Indeed, from Danbury Hatters' until First National
Maintenance,240 the Supreme Court had always construed that phrase,
whether in section 8(d) of the NLRA2 '1 or in section 13(c) of
Norris-LaGuardia, 2 as extending to all matters which directly and vitally
affect or concern employees."
Moreover, the Court has long recognized that section 8(d) and section
13(c) are cognates. In Jewel Tea Co."4 the Court rejected the union's argu-
ment that the determination of whether "marketing hours" is a mandatory
subject under section 8(d) is a matter within the "primary jurisdiction" of
the Board. It reasoned that the phrase "terms and conditions of employ-
ment" means the same thing in section 8(d) and in section 13(c): "[C]ourts
are ... not without experience in classifying subjects.... Just such a deter-
mination must be frequently made when a court's jurisdiction to issue an
injunction affecting a labor dispute is challenged under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act." 5 In light of Jewel Tea Co., the Court's decision in First
National Maintenance to limit its discussion of Order of Railroad
Telegraphers v. Chicago & North Western Railway Co.48 to a footnote247 is
baffling; for in that case the Court specifically held that the union's threat
to strike over the railroad's closing of inefficient stations was a "labor
dispute" within the meaning of section 13(c). 48
NLRA § 2(9) and 9(a), codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(9) and 159(a) (1976).
, Justice Stewart, in his Fibreboard concurrence, attempted to argue that the words
of 8(d) are "words of limitation." 379 U.S. at 220 (Stewart, J., concurring). First Natl
Maintenance, of course, rejected the notion that matters of vital concern to employees are
necessarily mandatory where the employer's focus is on profitability. Both opinions ignore
the history of § 8(d) as well as the specificity requirement of § 13 of the NLRA.
2' See cases cited supra note 106.
22 See cases cited supra notes 236-38.
24 Borg-Warner is not inconsistent with this. The Court there only recognized that a
union's (or, by analogy, an employer's) internal decision-making processes were not man-
datory. The employer was legitimately concerned with the union's decision to strike, but
not with how it made that decision. See supra text accompanying note 55.
24 381 U.S. 676 (1965). See supra, note 106.
2,5 Id. at 686.
2,2 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
24 452 U.S. at 686 n.23.
248 362 U.S. at 335. The Court was technically correct that Railroad Telegraphers "does
not require that we find bargaining over this partial closing decision mandatory:' First
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In sum, given the early history of the phrase "terms and conditions of
employment," Congress' adoption of it in preference to a specific list of nar-
row topics, and the Court's consistently broad construction thereof, it would
be bizarre to treat it as embodying the kind of specific limitation on
employee concerted activities which section 13 of the NLRA requires.
Moreover, to argue that treating plant closings as a non-mandatory sub-
ject promotes the "ulterior purpose" of the Act, one must take account of
Congress' express section 13 limitation on the judicial power to restrict
the right to strike or picket.
3. Employee Free Choice, Employer Profitability, and the
Ulterior Purpose of the Act
The preceding argument has shown that Congress did not intend to pro-
tect an individual employer's profitability whenever it would be put at risk
by employees exercising their section 7 rights, nor did it intend to specific-
ally limit the mandatory subjects of bargaining. Yet, interestingly, these
conclusions do not disprove the Court's claim in First National Maintenance
that the ulterior purpose of the Act is to promote commerce. Rather, they
suggest that the relationship of the various purposes of the Act are more
complex; for the Act embodied Congress' express judgment that in the long
run the system of employee free choice is itself necessary to commerce.249
Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 686 n.23. The cases are not on all fours. Railroad Telegraphers
was decided under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, as accommodated with the Railway Labor
Act, 45 U.S.C. SS 151-88 (1976), and the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 55'1-27 (1976);
First Nat'l Maintenance involved only the NLRA. Identical language often means different
things in different contexts. The problem is that the Court offered no reason, but only
its naked conclusion, that partial closings are within "terms or conditions" in 5 13(c) of
Norris-LaGuardia and not within "terms or conditions" in S 8(d) of the NLRA. 362 U.S.
at 337. Legislative history and precedent argue that this is a distinction without significance.
29 Section 1 of the Act states:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and
the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining
lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife... which have.., the necessary
effect of burdening or obstructing commerce ....
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who
are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substan-
tially burdens and affects the flow of commerce ....
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees
to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impair-
ment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain
recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fun-
damental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of dif-
ferences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring
equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.
29 U.S.C. S 151 (1976) (emphasis added).
Cf. Railroad Telegraphers, 362 U.S. at 342, where the Court dealt with a similar argu-
ment from statutory purpose:
[W]e have taken due account of the railroad's argument that the operation
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The Court itself has long recognized that "the removal of... obstruc-
tions [to self-organization] was the driving force behind enactment of the
National Labor Relations Act."' And, although the protection of employee
associational rights was not the impetus for the Taft-Hartley Act, its amend-
ment to the NLRA did not evince a rejection of the congressional judg-
ment as to the function and importance of those rights. Indeed, by specifying
the section 8(b) limitations so narrowly and by requiring in section 13 a
strict construction of section 8(b), Congress re-affirmed the preferred status
of employee free choice within the Act.
Despite the fact that management decisions which lead to loss of employ-
ment fall within the plain meaning of section 8(d), it does not follow that
congressional purpose will either be promoted by requiring bargaining over
managerial job-terminating decisions, or be frustrated by not doing so.2 51
If a construction of the Act which protects employer autonomy (an
employer-protective test or rule) would have a relatively slight impact on
the system of employee free choice, while a construction that protects
employee free choice (an employee-protective test or rule) would
systematically impair employer profitability and destroy commerce, then
the former construction should be chosen to further the purposes of the
Act.' Unfortunately, the Court in First National Maintenance did not weigh
these systematic risks before it adopted its employer-protective rule.
of unnecessary stations, services, and lines is wasteful and thus runs counter
to the congressional policy, expressed in the Interstate Commerce Act, to foster
an efficient national railroad system. In ... the Railway Labor and Norris-
LaGuardia Acts, Congress has acted on the assumption that collective
bargaining ... will also foster an efficient national railroad system.
The Court went on to argue that, since Congress knew that collective bargaining would
add to labor costs, its notion of "efficiency" must not count increased labor costs as waste.
The Court acknowledged that some might view the social judgment that would allow the
union to bankrupt the employer as unsound; but it condemned any attempt to narrow the
Norris-LaGuardia Act as "beyond the judicial province." Id. at 342. Cf the discussion of
the reasons favoring judicial deference to the Board, infra notes 359-86 and accompanying
text. See also NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257-58 (1939) ("the fun-
damental policy of the Act is to safeguard the rights of self-organization and collective
bargaining, and thus by the promotion of industrial peace to remove obstructions to the
free flow of commerce").
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 186 (1941).
=' The Statute of Frauds provides an illuminating example. The ulterior purpose of that
statute is clearly to prevent frauds. Parliament concluded that requiring written and signed
documents would generally promote that purpose. Nonetheless, it has been widely recognized
that literal application of the Statute of Frauds will often lead to frauds. As a result, "there
is scarcely a group of these oral contracts in which the court has not struggled vigorously
to prevent such a result." Radin, supra note 169, at 877. Cf Murphy, supra note 66.
1 Professor Fried's analysis of interest balancing is particularly useful here. Supra note
153. He argued what should be obvious; namely, that the Court should balance interests
at the same level of generality. But, he went on, "[t]his obvious requirement does not answer
the really difficult question, which is at what level of generality should it consider both
claims." Id. at 763. Fried proceeded to argue that a "particularistic" test is appropriate
to those many decisions which are not meant to establish a general rule of conduct, but
that a "systematic" balancing is required for establishing competences. He summarized:
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B. Balancing the Risks
If the preceding analysis is correct, the Court erred in establishing its
test in First National Maintenance without first balancing the risks of an
employer-protective test to employee interests in free choice and job secur-
ity against the risks of an employee-protective test to employer profits.
Moreover, appropriate deference should have led the Court to respect Con-
gress' finding that the scheme of employee free associational rights is itself
crucial to commerce. Hence, unless the systematic risk to employee in-
terests was clearly outweighed by the systematic risk to profitability -
and unless those risks were of a sort that Congress could not reasonably
have discounted when it enacted the NLRA-the Court should have ap-
proved an employee-protective standard. It is to assessment of these risks
that we now turn.
1. Risks to Employee Free Choice
a. Preliminary Considerations. Before assessing the impact of an
employer-protective test on employee free choice, it is necessary to con-
sider the problems of methodology and of relevance. First, are there reasons
to believe that employer conduct significantly affects employee free choice,
and if so, are there criteria to distinguish effective from ineffective in-
terference? Second, assuming that effective interference occurs, who are
the "employees" whose free choice should count on the scale?
(1) Methodology. It is difficult to evaluate the risks that an employer-
protective test would pose for employee free choice in deciding whether
to organize or to vote for a union (or to accept a contract offer, or to strike).'
The Board and the Court have long asserted that employee free choice,
"[A] litigant's reference to freedom of speech ... is not simply a claim for immediate satisfac-
tion, it is the assertion of an interest which can be understood only as a reference to
systematic ways of doing things, to roles, institutions and practices:' Id. at 769.
Likewise, at the particularistic level the conflict over decision-bargaining concerns merely
the jobs of the terminated employees and the profits of the individual employer. But at
the systematic level it concerns the system of employee free choice established by the
NLRA and the system of commerce which the NLRA was designed to enhance. Thus, the
Court should have tested the union and employer competences in terms of the risks of
alternative rules. Instead, the Court "prejudiced the decision," id. at 763, by balancing
the very particular and narrow wants of the immediate employees against the systematic
interests of employers generally.
2- The task depends in large measure on one's philosophical judgments (or assumptions)
about freedom and the nature of man. See B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CON-
STITUTION 5 (1977) ("analysts must become philosophers if they wish to remain lawyers").
Ackerman limited his consideration to the implications of utilitarian and Kantian philosophies.
Cf. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). Labor law is in desperate need of
this type of analysis; unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this article.
[Vol. 58:433
FIRST NATIONAL MAINTENANCE
at least on the representational question, is fragile.' But the famous Get-
man study 5 challenged the empirical basis for that theory.
The Board and the Court have habitually assumed that employees are
prey to illicit employer influence. The Board has regularly set aside elec-
tions in which the victor has committed unfair labor practices.' Moreover,
the Supreme Court has approved the remedial use of bargaining orders
where the Board finds: (a) that a union which at one time had majority sup-
port (as demonstrated by signed authorization cards) has lost that support
as a result of employer unfair labor practices,5 7 and (b) that the union
authorization cards are "a more reliable test of the employee's desires" than
an election.' The Court has also approved the Board's "laboratory condi-
I The Court has often, if not consistently, been much more sensitive to and restrictive
of employer "interference" with employee free choice in the organizational phase than in
the bargaining phase of their relationship. Compare NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S.
405 (1964) (grant of benefit); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) (threat to
close); ILGWU v. NLRB (Bernhardt-Altmann Texas Corp.), 366 U.S. 731 (1961) (recognition
of minority union); with NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952) (insistence
on management rights clause on mandatory subjects); H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S.
99 (1970) (limiting remedy for bad faith bargaining); American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB,
380 U.S. 300 (1965) (offensive lockout); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333
(1938) (permanent replacement of strikers).
The Court's rationale for distinguishing these phases has been that the Act was designed
to assure the right to organize in order to gain equality of bargaining power, but that
once a bargaining relationship has been established, the Act requires official neutrality
on the outcome. Attempts to fine-tune the relative power of management and labor in ac-
tual bargaining risk governmental interference or control over the actual terms of the
bargain. The Court articulated this most clearly in American Shipbuilding where it said:
Having protected employee organization in countervailence to the employer's
bargaining power, and having established a system of collective bargaining
whereby the newly coequal adversaries might resolve their disputes, the Act
also contemplated resort to economic weapons should more peaceful measures
not avail. Sections 8(aXl) and [8(a)]3) do not give the Board a general authority
to assess the relative economic power of the adversaries in the bargaining
process and to deny weapons to one party or the other because of its assess-
ment of that party's bargaining power.
380 U.S. at 317. Whatever the merits of this argument in ordinary collective bargaining
situations, the distinction is hard to understand where an employer's response to a deci-
sion to unionize is to close that part of its business.
Since the Court has developed this distinction, the analysis of impact on employee free
choice will focus almost entirely on the choice of representation. However, the categoriza-
tion of partial closing decisions as mandatory or permissive inherently affects the relative
bargaining power of the parties on other, clearly mandatory, subjects, such as the effects
of a closing. Thus the Court could not really avoid affecting the relative bargaining power
of the parties; it could only avoid assessing the meaning of its decision.
J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG, & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND
REALITY (1976) [hereinafter cited as J. GETMAN].
I See, e.g., Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962)
= NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969).
Id. at 616. Union authorization cards are not, of course, signed in a private voting
booth. Therefore, to conclude that they may represent a truer indicator of employee free
choice than did or would a secret ballot, the Court must have assumed that employer con-
duct not only can "force" an employee to deny his true desire for a union when questioned
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tions" doctrine, under which it sets aside elections (in the absence of un-
fair labor practices) where the victor's "[c]onduct [has] create[d] an at-
mosphere which renders improbable a free choice."'
Implicit in these decisions is the assumption that voters, being rational,
cast their votes to maximize their own satisfaction.' In an ordinary political
contest, voters will not decide to vote for a candidate because she promises
(or threatens) to use her office to harm them; unless the candidate wins,
she will not have the power to carry out her threats."' Suppose, for exam-
ple, a candidate promises to vote against student loans or social security.
Voters who believe that they would benefit from these programs are not
likely to vote for the candidate because she has threatened their interests,
although they might well vote for her on other grounds.
But a union representation election is different. Employees are, to some
degree, "economic[ally] dependen[t]"26 2 on their employer, whether the union
wins or loses the election. Suppose, then, that an employer, by speech or
conduct, convinces its employees that, should they choose a union, it will
exercise its economic power to punish them or to render unionization futile.
In that case employees who would otherwise prefer representation might
be "persuaded" that a union would not promote their interests.
The authors of the Getman study eschewed such theorizing. Instead they
gathered and evaluated empirical data on the effect of campaign behavior
on employee voters.6 5 Each employee was interviewed twice. In the first
interview, conducted early in the official campaign period, the employees
were questioned about their predispositions and attitudes. In the second
interview, conducted shortly after the vote, they were asked how they had
voted, why they had done so, and what they recalled from the campaign. 214
The authors found that, on average, eighty-one percent of the employees
actually voted as they had been inclined at the time of the initial interview.2 5
Of the nineteen percent who had switched between the interviews or who
by the employer, but also can overbear his capacity to vote his choice even when the
employer cannot observe. Presumably, the employee fear that reaches into the voting booth
will not be fear that he/she will be singled out for discriminatory treatment, but that the
employer will punish the whole bargaining unit if the union wins. Hence, threats of plant
closings seem ideally suited to the Gissel theory of employee free choice. See infra text
accompanying notes 281-327.
"' General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126-27 (1948). Cf. NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414
U.S. 270, 279 (1973) (Board should have set aside election).
I This is the basic theory of both Utilitarian philosophy and welfare economics.
"1 Cf. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 617-18. This, of course, need not be the case where
a candidate has unofficial means of causing the harm. And a winning candidate may use
her office to punish those groups that voted for the opposing candidate. But cf. J. GET-
MAN, supra note 255 at 27-28.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 617.
Getman did analyze the empirical studies on voter behavior in political contests in
arguing that the Board's assumptions are incorrect. See J. GETMAN, supra note 255, at 27-32.
1 J. GETMAN, supra note 255, at 3342.
2' Id. at 62.
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had originally been undecided, the authors claimed that the data did not
show them to have been influenced substantially by the campaign, whether
legal or illegal.'66 On this basis the authors concluded that the assumptions
about employee free choice underlying the Board's regulation of campaigns
were false.21
7
The Getman study was pathbreaking and provocative. Indeed, were it
persuasive, it would suggest great caution in inferring that plant closings
have a substantial impact on employee free choice. But its data do not com-
pel its conclusions about the strength of employee free choice in the face
of determined employer opposition.26 In fact, those data can reasonably
be read to support, rather than to refute, the Board's fragility theory.
First, the sample was severely skewed. The authors sought "to test the
effect of... unlawful campaigning." '269 Because their resources were limited,
they neither chose their sample randomly, nor used a control group. 0 In-
stead, they selected elections in which the employers' known animus to
unionization, their prior illegal conduct and their selection of a union-busting
law firm showed a "high potential for illegal behavior."2
71
During a period when unions won 49.1% of similar elections nationally," 2
the unions won only 25.8% of the campaigns in the Getman study. 3 The
probability that such skewed outcomes would occur by chance is slight, only
about .25% or one in four hundred.' 4 But if employee free choice were, in
fact, fragile, such an outcome, in elections chosen by the Getman criteria,
would seem likely. Indeed, one might have predicted that those employees
who were particularly susceptible to employer influence would have been
swayed by employer antiunion communications which preceded the first
interview or by their employer's reputation for animus to unionization.7
The authors do not offer any alternative explanation for why their sam-
ple, chosen as it was, should result in a union victory rate only half that
in the general group of elections. They did explore the possibility that cam-
' Id at 109, 129-30.
2' Id. at 146-56. The major purpose of the study was to evaluate the costs and benefits
of campaign regulation, an interesting inquiry, but one tangential to decision-bargaining.
'0 The literature evaluating the Getman study has praised the work as valuable and
innovative, but has pointed to serious flaws both in its methodology and its interpretation
of results. See, e.g., Eames, An Analysis of the Union Voting Study from a Trade-Unionist's
Point of View, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1181 (1976); Peck, Review: NLRB Election Law, 53 WASH.
L. REV. 197, 206-09 (1977). But cf. Shapiro, Why Do Voters Vote?, 86 YALE L.J. 1532 (1977);
Miller, The Getman, Goldberg, and Herman Questions, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1976).
211 J. GETMAN, supra note 255, at 34.
17 See, e.g., Eames, supra note 268, at 1182-85; Roomkin, Book Review, 27 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1056, 1059-60 (1977); Shapiro, supra note 268, at 1536.
2'1 J. GETMAN, supra note 255, at 34.
271 In the 1973 fiscal year, Unions won 49.1% of 8739 elections in which a single union
was on the ballot and 51.1% of all elections. 38 NLRB, ANN. REP. 231-32 (1973). See Roomkin,
supra note 270, at 1059-60.
",3 J. GETMAN, supra note 255, at 33.
'7' This probability is easily calculated.
27' The data are too thin to demonstrate this.
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paigning before the first interview had influenced employees, but found
no difference between elections in which there had been such campaigning
and those in which there had not."' Thus the study neither explains the
unusual results, nor disproves the plausible hypothesis that they were
caused by long-term employer "communication" of attitude.
Second, had the authors obtained the same results from a representative
sample, their data would still have been insufficient to demonstrate that
employer antiunion conduct does not significantly affect the election out-
come. While on average only nineteen percent of voters switched, more
switched to the company side than to the union sideY7 Moreover, some
employer campaigns were far more successful than average. In the five
most successful employer campaigns, the union lost thirty-five percent of
its members from the time of card signing to the time of the election, and
fifteen percent from the time of initial interview until the time of the
election."' Yet the authors "could find no characteristics" to explain these
results. 9
Whatever the validity of the Getman study, the Board and the Court
have continued to assume that, due to the economic dependence of
employees on employers, employee free choice can be illicitly overborne
by employer interference. This judgment is consistent with the widely-held
view that people make decisions to maximize perceived satisfaction. The
Getman study does not refute that view and, in fact, contains some evidence
to support it."'0
Therefore, the analysis of risk which follows assumes that when an
employer engages in severe antiunion conduct, it often does interfere with
employee free choice. It distinguishes effective from ineffective interference
by considering whether an ordinary employee, seeking to maximize his/her
satisfaction, would perceive a plant closing as a punishment for unioniza-
tion, as a serious threat to punish for unionization in the future, or as a
promise to render unionization futile.
(2) Relevance. There are three groups of employees whose response to
a plant closing might be relevant: the employees who were terminated ("ter-
minated employees"); other employees of the same employer who become
aware of the closing ("the employer's other employees"); and employees
of other employers who learn of the closing ("other employers' employees").
Together they constitute the class of "aware employees."
Clearly the impact of a closing on the terminated employees and on the
27 J. GETMAN, supra note 255, at 69-70.
2" Id.
27 Id. at 100-101.
"' id. at 101.
The continued, and apparently growing, expenditure of corporate funds to engage
labor relations consultants and antiunion law firms suggests that employers also have not
been persuaded by the Getman results. See Bernstein, supra note 20.
[Vol. 58:433
FIRST NATIONAL MAINTENANCE
employer's other employees is relevant.?' The question is whether the ef-
fect on other employers' employees must-or even may-be considered.
As we have seen, Congress intended the Norris-LaGuardia Act to erect
a firm boundary against federal injunctive interference with employees pur-
suing their self-interest.' Therefore, it defined "labor dispute" broadly:
"regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate rela-
tion of employer and employee."' The NLRA adopted that definition' and
further defined "'employee' ... [as] not.., limited to the employees of
a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise. ' Hence,
the effect of employer conduct on employees other than its own should be
weighed in evaluating alternative constructions of the Act. 8'
b. An Employer-Protective Test Inevitably Risks Injuring Employee Rights.
Suppose that an employer-protective test could be drawn so that it pro-
tected an employer's closing decision if, but only if, the decision were based
solely on economic consideration (beyond the control of the employer and
the union) and contained no element of antiunion animus. Suppose further
that employees were confident of this. Closings protected on this basis
would not chill employee free choice. Employees would understand that
the employer did not act to punish their union affiliation and could
reasonably presume that if the closing had been based on factors within
the control of the collective bargaining process, the employer would have
bargained.
Such a rule is, however, impossible.28 7 Each increment of protection for
11 In Darlington the Court required the Board to find that the employer intended to
chill its other employees as an element of a partial closing violation under S 8(a)(3). 380
U.S. 263, 275-76. It thereby implied that such chilling is relevant. The Court did not hold
that the effect on the terminated employees was irrelevant to the Act, but only that it
was insufficient to support a violation of S 8(a)(3) in the partial closing context.
See discussion supra notes 214-48 and accompanying text.
2 Norris-LaGuardia Act S 13, 29 U.S.C. 5 113 (1976).
NLRA S 2(9), 29 U.S.C. 5 152 (1976).
NLRA S 2(3), 29 U.S.C. 5 152(3) (1976).
The Supreme Court has itself accepted the principle of considering the risks to the
rights of employees of other employers. In First Nat'l Maintenance, it considered the risks
of an employee-protective rule to the general class of employers, not just to FNM itself.
See 452 U.S. at 682-86.
Indeed, the court has gone further by recognizing that an employer may actually com-
mit an unfair labor practice by interfering with the S 7 rights of other employers' employees.
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522, and n.11 (1976). The employer there stood to benefit
from the interference because he was the landlord of the immediate employer. Hudgens,
230 N.L.R.B. 414, 418 (1977) (cited with approval in Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 651
F.2d 1272, 1273 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980)). While there will generally be no immediate benefit
to an employer who chills other employers' employees (unless it later attempts to hire
them), that would be no reason to exclude those employees' interests in devising criteria
for general application. Cf. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381
U.S. 676, 727-28 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (considering the effect of hour regulations at
one market on employees of other markets).
2" This is the converse to the Court's argument in First Nat'l Maintenance that an
employee-protective rule would necessarily chill employer autonomy in making purely
economic partial closing decisions. See discussion supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
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employer autonomy is won at inevitable cost to employee free choice. The
reasons for this are plain:
(1) Economic and antiunion motivation are not mutually exclusive. An
employer may oppose unionization on purely philosophical grounds (opposi-
tion to collective relationships), or on psychological ones (resistance to shar-
ing power). But since the collective power of unionized employees is usually
perceived as increasing the costs of production, it is economics which
generally "engenders employer antipathy toward the union.""
(2) Even if economic and antiunion motivation were conceptually distinct,
proving which was the actual motive for a particular closing would be dif-
ficult. In individual discharge cases, the Board can use the employer's past
practice in similar cases involving no element of antiunion animus as a bench
mark for judging whether the employee would have been fired regardless
of antiunion motivation.89 Even in this context, however, distinguishing
discriminatory from non-discriminatory discharges has proven difficult. °
In the plant closing context, the problem is more acute. Few employers
have established a sufficient track record of closing non-unionized locations
to provide a standard against which the Board can measure the purity of
the claimed economic motivation. Further, the variety and complexity of
the data, including changes in the national economy, in the condition of the
company, and in managerial philosophies, make comparison more difficult.
(3) Legal proof, even of objective facts, is inherently uncertain. A party
bearing the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence must
surely lose some meritorious cases (and win some non-meritorious ones).
As the burden increases from a preponderance to clear and convincing proof
or even to proof'beyond a reasonable doubt, the proportion of meritorious
cases which fail also increases.29' This cost may be justified on the ground
that the social benefit of avoiding plaintiff victories in non-meritorious cases
exceeds the cost of the increased failure of meritorious cases. But that does
not gainsay the reality of those costs.
Likewise, the more a test protects employer autonomy to make purely
economic partial-closing decisions, the greater the risk that meritorious
2" A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 241 (9th ed. 1981).
See, e.g., Harrison Steel Castings Co., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 110 L.R.R.M. 11424 (1982)
(employee properly discharged for absenteeism where employer had previously discharged'
other employees in like circumstances.)
'" Compare Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F.2d 86 (3rd Cir. 1943) (discharge
result of pro-union activity); with Mueller Brass Co., v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Board finding of improper discharge reversed for lack of evidence). The Board has recently
attempted to simplify its approach to mixed motive cases. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B.
1083 (1980), enforced on other grounds, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1612 (1982). Cf. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (employer should
have opportunity to prove alternative motives).
"I This assumes that the fact-finder takes the burden seriously and that the prosecutor
or plaintiff chooses its cases rationally in light of the hurdles it faces, the costs of suit,
and the benefits of victory.
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claims of antiunion motivation will fail. First NationalMaintenance, for ex-
ample, is susceptible to various constructions. At one extreme, the burden
would be placed on the General Counsel to prove that an employer closed
one location for the purpose of chilling unionization at its other locations.
29 2
Alternatively, the General Counsel could be required to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that antiunion animus motivated the deci-
sion to close. 3 The burden on the General Counsel could be further reduc-
ed by shifting to the employer the task of proving that it would have closed
in the absence of unionization, where the General Counsel first has proved
that antiunion animus was a factor in the decision." Although the precise
impact of an employer-protective rule would depend on such incidental
determinations, each of these constructions would guarantee a substantial
chilling of employee free choice29
(4) The availability of antiunion counsel to advise employers how to ac-
complish their aims without leaving a trail of incriminating evidence would
make the General Counsel's task tougher. Whatever the moral or profes-
sional limitations on such advice, 28 its availability is beyond dispute.297
(5) An employer-protective test would require a greater expenditure of
the limited resources' of the Board to protect employee free choice than
would an employee-protective test. If it is presumed that an employer has
a duty to bargain unless it can prove that it closed due to an economic
emergency which would have rendered bargaining futile (an employee-
protective test),9 few cases will need to be litigated to protect employee
Cf. Darlington, 380 U.S. at 275 (partial closing violates NLRA if employer has im-
proper motive and chilling effect foreseeable); NLRB v. William J. Burns Int'l Detective
Agency, 346 F.2d 897, 902 (8th Cir. 1965) (lack of antiunion motive at one location precludes
finding violation at another).
Cf. NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899, 904 and n.8 (1st Cir. 1981), enforcing on other
grounds, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, (1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1612 (1982).
Cf. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980).
These and other ways of interpreting the Court's holding on economically motivated
decisions to close will be considered in the conclusion of this article. See infra note 387.
See Bernstein, supra note 20, at 56-62.
Bernstein, supra note 20, passim. Consider, for example, the Darlington case. On re-
mand, the Board had to consider whether the plant was closed for the specific purpose
of chilling the employer's other employees. The Board found significant evidence of such
intent in a mailing to officers at each of the employer's local plants of copies of newspaper
and magazine articles which ascribed the closing of the Darlington plant to unionization,
along with a cover letter calling on the local officers to use this information to' get the
support of community leaders. Darlington Mfg. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1079-80 (1967). Had
the Darlington decision preceded this mailing, counsel would surely have advised against
it being sent. The objective of the closing would have remained the same; but the evidence
would have been suppressed. Cf. N. WILLIAMS, 3 AMERICAN PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND
THE POLICE POWER 124 (1975 & Supp. 1982) (making a similar point about the requirements
of proof of intent in cases challenging discriminatory zoning).
11 Budget cutbacks in the face of heavy caseloads have contributed to increased delay
of Board decisions. See 1981 LAB. REL. Y.B. 168-70, 172-73, 204-06 (1982); 109 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) 104, 151 (1982); 110 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 3-4, 238-39 (1982).
See, e.g., the Board decision cited supra notes 90-99.
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interests and those will generally involve relatively simple issues." In First
National Maintenance, for example, the administrative law judge excluded
evidence of antiunion animus and kept to a minimum evidence of economic
motivation, apparently because he deemed it irrelevant."
Given the increased burden of an employer-protective test, the General
Counsel under such a test would probably decide not to pursue cases which
it might otherwise have prosecuted, °2 or to settle them on terms less
favorable to the employees."3 This would add to the insulation of employers'
decisions and increase the chill on employees.
c. The Risks are Severe and Widespread. For the foregoing reasons an
employer-protective test would necessarily result in some chilling of the
free choice of some employees. The questions remain how severe and
widespread the chilling effect would be.
Since the employer conduct on employee free choice is measured by the
degree to which the employer communicates its determination to punish
unionization or to render it futile, the impact of what employees perceive
to be an antiunion closing would be higher than that of any other type of
employer antiunion conduct."4 The impact on the terminated employees
is clear. They would perceive that the employer punished them for assert-
ing their choice to be represented. Furthermore, they would note the failure
of the government to protect them in exercising a right which the govern-
ment claimed to guarantee. Therefore, their faith in the system of employee
free choice might be shattered and their "free choice" in future represen-
tation elections diminished. 05
' On the other hand, it is arguable that employers will chose to litigate more cases
under an employee-protective test than under an employer-protective test, in order to pro-
tect their interests. But the decision whether to litigate to protect employee interests under
an employer-protective test will rest with the General Counsel, not with the union. The
General Counsel would certainly find it more difficult and more expensive to prove anti-
union animus, than to prove that an employer closed without bargaining and, if the employer
raised the defense, that no economic emergency sufficient to render bargaining futile had
occurred.
"1 See infra note 303. First Nat'l Maintenance, 242 N.L.REB. 462, 464-66 (1979).
' See, e.g., Advice Memorandum from Harold J. Datz, NLRB Associate General Counsel,
Division of Advice, Re: Swift & Co., 108 L.R.R.M. 1071 (1981).
" The authority to decide which unfair labor practice charges will be prosecuted rests
with the General Counsel. The General Counsel's decision not to file a complaint is, accord-
ing to received wisdom, unreviewable. See NLRA § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. S 153(d) (1976); Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967). M. MCCLINTOCK, NLRB GENERAL COUNSEL: UNREVIEWABLE
POWER TO ISSUE AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE COMPLAINT (1980). Hence, the employees and the
union would not be in a position to decide to attack what they perceived as an antiunion
plant closing without the General Counsel's cooperation.
" Cf. Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 138 (1981), where Justice Marshall, in dissent,
pointed to "the plain and powerful symbolic message" incident to closing a road used by
blacks to drive through a white neighborhood.
' It would, of course, be simplistic to assume that all such employees would vote against
unionization in future elections. Some might become entrenched in their pro-union views
while losing faith in the integrity of employers and government. In the long run, this could
threaten industrial peace. But others, calculating their own satisfaction, might decide that
union representation is a threat to their livelihoods and vote against unions in the future
on that basis.
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The impact on the employer's other employees is likewise clear. The
employer would have conveyed its willingness to sacrifice an ongoing part
of its business to punish unionization. Those employees would likely infer
that the employer would do the same to them.
3 16
The impact on other employer's employees would depend, in part, on their
views of their own employer. Those who believe that their employer is not
opposed to unionization or would not sacrifice part of its business to
frustrate unionization would not be chilled. But to the extent that they
believe their employer would sacrifice a profitable operation to keep a union
out and have lost their faith in the federal guarantee of their rights, they
would be very chilled indeed.
The severity of chill would vary also with the characteristics and state
of unionization of the employer's business. Consider the differences among
the following three situations: (1) a total closing of the employer's business;
(2) a partial closing of a business which is unionized at all locations; and
(3) a partial closing of the only (and newly) unionized location of a multi-
location business.
(1) Total Closing. Oddly, a total closing would probably have the least
impact on employee free choice. As the Court contended in Darlington:
[A] complete liquidation of a business yields no ... future benefit for
the employer, if the termination is bona fide. It may be motivated more
by spite against the union than by business reasons, but it is not the
type of discrimination which is prohibited by the Act. The personal
satisfaction that such an employer may derive from standing on his
beliefs and the mere possibility that other employers will follow his ex-
ample are surely too remote to be considered dangers at which the labor
statutes were aimed 3 l
A total antiunion closing would frustrate the free choice of the terminated
employees, but it would not likely have much broader impact. By defini-
tion that employer would have no other employees. Moreover, employees
of other employers would recognize that few employers would be prepared,
as a matter of principle, to sacrifice a successful business on the altar of
antiunionism.
(2) Partial Closing; All Locations Unionized. A partial closing in a general-
ly unionized, multi-location business presents a more complex problem.
First, where the union is strongly entrenched, the employer is unlikely to
close a profitable location out of antiunion spite. The union can use its
organizational strength at the remaining locations to defend its own and
the employees' interests. Indeed, if the employees believe that the employer
I Even if the location which is closed is at a great distance from those which are not,
the employees are likely to hear what happened. The employer can assure that its message
gets through without providing proof that it closed for the purpose of so communicating.
Compare Darlington, 165 N.L.R.B. at 1079-80, discussed supra note 297 and accompanying
text; with Morrison Cafeterias Consol., 177 N.L.R.B. 591 (1969), enforcement denied on other
grounds, 431 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1970).
1 380 U.S. at 272 (citation omitted).
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closed to punish unionization, rather than because of economics, their
organizational unity may be strengthened."
Second, in reaction to an employer-protective rule, a strong union which
represents the employees of a highly unionized employer might push at
the next round of collective bargaining negotiations for contractual provi-
sions which either require decision-bargaining or, at least, provide substan-
tial protection for terminated employees. Hence, an employer-protective
rule would promise to be of decreasing importance in highly unionized
industries.
This is not sheer speculation. Even before First National Maintenance,
major unionized employers had often engaged in bargaining - and made
enforceable promises - which recognized and protected their employees'
interest in job security. A Department of Labor study, published the month
after the Court's decision, found that thirty-six percent of the collective
bargaining agreements analyzed "placed restrictions of some type on
management's right to close or relocate.""S Significantly, those agreements
which restricted management covered forty-nine percent of the employees
in the study. 1 Although only two percent of the agreements required
decision-bargaining over specific closings,"' thirty-four percent required
"advance notice and union participation.",1 2 Moreover, thirty-five percent
provided for employee transfer"' 3 and fourteen percent for relocation
allowances.314
Those provisions which do not require bargaining over the substantive
decisions to close an individual location build into the employer's decision-
making process some of the costs that would otherwise fall on the employees
or on their communities. Thus, provisions requiring advance notice and par-
ticipation, or transfer with relocation allowance, or substantial severance
" But see Bernstein, supra note 20, at 7, on the use of decertification by union-busting
firms.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEFT OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-20, MAJOR COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: PLANT MOVEMENT, INTERPLANT TRANSFER AND RELOCATION
ALLOWANCES 6 (1981) [hereinafter cited as BLS-81] (emphasis added). The Supreme Court relied
on other sources to show that "current labor practice ... supports the apparent imbalance
weighing against mandatory bargaining." 452 U.S. at 684 (citing II COLL. BARG'G. NEG. &
CONT. (BNA) S 65 at 201-33 (1981)) (providing sample agreements, but no statistics), and BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2065, CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS (1978) (a study not specifically directed to plant closing pro-
visions). The Court also cited an earlier Department of Labor study which the 1982 study
was intended to replace. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, BULL. No.
1425-10, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: PLANT MOVEMENT, TRANSFER. AND
RELOCATION ALLOWANCES (1969) [hereinafter cited as BLS-69].
310 BLS-81, supra note 309, at 3.
SI' Id. at 8. Ten agreements required union agreement to a closing; two required only
good faith bargaining.
32 Id. at 3.
313 Id.
311 Id. at 83 (225 of 1593 agreements).
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pay, will have much the same effect as an employee-protective rule about
decision-bargaining. Such provisions will constrain employers to consider
not only their own profitability, but also the costs to employees. 15
Third, the decision in First National Maintenance has not reversed this
trend of bargaining over an employer's decision to partially close its
facilities; indeed, it may have accelerated it. Since the Court established
its employer-protective rule, unions have successfully bargained for job
security/plant closing provisions in a host of major industries. 16 Some have
even bargained for employee buy-outs of factories which management had
decided to close. 1
7
Fourth, there is no reason to expect FirstNational Maintenance to reduce
such bargaining in the future. Bargaining about whether to bargain over
hypothetical, future plant closings can be distinguished from bargaining
about an imminent decision to close a particular plant. 18 The Court in First
National Maintenance itself suggested that unions "may secure in contract
The Supreme Court recognized this in Fibreboard. When it considered the implica-
tions of industrial practice for the "amenability" of subcontracting to bargaining, the Court
relied on a Bureau of Labor Statistics study which had found that 22% of major collective
bargaining agreements "contained someform of a limitation on subcontracting." 379 U.S.
at 212 n.7 (emphasis added) (citing Luden, Subcontracting Clauses in Major Contracts, 84
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 579, 581 (1961)).
The Court's use of statistics in First Nat'l Maintenance was, therefore, strange. The
Court contended that "current labor practice ... supports the apparent imbalance weighing
against mandatory bargaining." 452 U.S. at 684. Yet, it relied in part on the old BLS study
of plant closing and relocation provisions, which showed that 22% of those agreements
contained "limitations." BLS-69, supra note 309, at 71. Thus, if the Court meant to use
this study to distinguish plant closing (First Nat'l Maintenance) from subcontracting
(Fibreboard) decisions, it chose the wrong figures to compare. Since the new study found
that 36% of agreements "limited" plant closings and relocations, BLS-81, supra note 309,
at 3, the Court appears to be rowing against the strong current of industrial practice.
"l' The provision vary widely; but all would either prevent or inhibit management deci-
sions to close or to relocate a plant. Armour & Company and Wilson Foods Corp. set the
trend for the meatpacking industry. In return for wage concessions from the United Food
and Commercial Workers Union, they agreed to halt plant closings for 18 months and to
recognize the union at new locations based on card majorities. I COLL. BARG'G. NEG. & CONT.
(BNA) § 18, at 146-47 (1982). That pattern was soon followed by other major meatpackers. Id.
Ford Motor Corporation led the way in the auto industry. Its new contract with the
UAW provides for a guaranteed income stream for long-term employees, additional funds
for the Supplemental Unemployment Benefits Fund, lifetime employment at several plants,
preferential transfer rights, continuation of benefits after layoff, and retraining. 109 LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) 141-43 (1982). General Motors followed. Id. at 265. See also id. at 289 (UAW-
with Dana Corp.); Id. at 295 (AT&T with CWA); 110 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 33-34, 66-67 (B.F.
Goodrich Co., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., and Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. with URW);
Id. at 34 (International Harvester Co. and UAW); Id. at 178 (General Electric with IUE
and UE) (all on file with author).
Note, Mandatory Bargaining and the Disposition of Closed Plants, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1896 & n.2 (1982).
Ill Management's interest in "speed, flexibility, and secrecy," First Nat'l Maintenance,
452 U.S. at 682, does not exist in bargaining ahead over unscheduled plant closings. If
a particular employer believes that those interests will be important to it in the future,
it can refuse to contract to decision-bargain.
1983]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
negotiations provisions implementing rights to notice, information, and fair
bargaining."'19 And even if an employer-protective rule were meant to ex-
clude "bargaining about whether to bargain" as a mandatory subject in
general contract negotiations, it would not be realistically enforceable.2
In sum, in the highly unionized sectors of the economy an employer-
protective rule would be (and First National Maintenance was) stillborn."'
(3) Partial Closings; Only Unionized Location. The question of decision-
bargaining under an employer-protective rule will, therefore, arise mainly
where an employer who is not generally unionized closes its only (or one
of its few) unionized locations. Unfortunately, these are the closings most
likely to chill the free choice of the terminated employees, of the employer's
other employees, and of other employers' employees.
Consider, for example, an employer whose business consists of subcon-
tracting to perform cleaning and maintenance services for other employers.
Presumably the purchasers of service want the best service at the least
cost. Unionization of any one subcontractor is likely to increase its costs
and make its services less desirable. Therefore, a union can succeed in
removing wages from competition only by organizing and gaining uniform
contracts throughout the market area.
Suppose further that a new, cut-rate non-union competitor enters the
market. If the union succeeds in organizing one of the new competitor's
452 U.S. at 682 (emphasis added).
See Cox, supra note 55, at 1076-77.
=' In the unionized sector, the rule has not done and will not do what the Court wanted;
it has not insulated and will not insulate employer autonomy in deciding whether to close
a plant. But it may significantly affect the outcome of general collective bargaining. A party
to bargaining whose claim the law protects in the absence of agreement otherwise is, as
a practical matter, in a position to trade off its right for something of value held by the
other party.
Thus, if a union has a statutory right to mandatory decision-bargaining over individual
plant-closing decisions, it will not ordinarily trade off wages to get such a right written
into the contract. On the other hand, if management has a statutory privilege to close
without bargaining, it will agree to limit that privilege only if the union "pays" for it.
Cf. Mnookin and Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,
88 YALE L.J. 950,971-72 (1979); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (ab-
sent transaction costs, liability rule will not affect resource allocation, but will affect relative
wealth of those whose interests conflict).
If this is a correct analysis of the significance of First Nat'l Maintenance in the unionized
sector, then it is clear that the Court has done what it had often castigated the Board
for doing; namely, it has "exercise[d] considerable [indirect] influence upon the substantive
terms on which the parties contract." NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S.
477, 490 (1960). See also American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317 (1965).
These cases are, of course distinguishable from First Nat'l Maintenance in that they did
not involve determination of whether a subject of bargaining is mandatory. But a party
whose right is protected, absent agreement otherwise, has an economic weapon much like
the power to institute a slow down in Insurance Agents' or the power to lockout in American
Shipbuilding. Thus, however scope of bargaining cases are decided, they necessarily affect
the relative bargaining power of the parties. Cf. R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES 10141
(1981).
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locations, the competitor can easily close that location and make an arguable
claim of economic motivation. Or it could bargain, make concessions, and
then close on the ground that the concessions were costly." The impact
of such a closing on the free choice of the discharged employees, of the
employer's other employees, and of other employers' employees would be
severe.
Employee apprehension would vary inversely with the level of employee
skill and the amount of employer capital invested at each location. In First
National Maintenance, for example, Greenpark provided tools and
supplies." Even if First National Maintenance had used its own tools and
supplies, it could have used the same tools on another job.2 ' The probabil-
ity that an employer would close to prevent unionization would increase
as the investment or the value of a particular location decreased.
The current organizational drive in the banking industry presents
another interesting example." Suppose that employees at a single branch
of a multi-branch bank vote for a union. What would prevent the bank from
closing that branch, putatively for economic reasons, but actually for the
purpose of discouraging unionization of its other locations? 26
The conclusion is ineluctable. A rule which protects employer autonomy
to make purely economic plant closing decisions necessarily will insulate
most antiunion plant closings. Employees who perceive such closings as
antiunion, who see that the terminated employees received no protection
under the Act, and who believe that their employer might follow suit, will
m The concessions would, of course, increase the employer's labor costs at the unionized
location relative to those at its non-union locations. Under existing constructions of the
NLRA, the union could respond by engaging in "area standards" picketing at the employer's
other locations. See Houston Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Claude Everett Constr. Co.),
136 N.L.R.B. 321 (1962) ("area standards" picketing, as distinguished from recognitional
picketing, not proscribed under § 8(b)(7)()); Local 41, Int'l Hod Carriers (Calumet Contrac-
tors Ass'n), 133 N.L.R.B. 512 (1961).
Indeed, the A.L.J. emphasized that "[t]here was no capital involved when it [FNM]
decided to terminate the Greenpark job." 242 N.L.R.B. at 466. The Court failed to apprehend
the significance of this when it stated:
[W]e do not believe that the absence of "significant investment or withdrawal
of capital," . . . is crucial. The decision to halt work at this specific location
represented a significant change in petitioner's operations, a change not unlike
opening a new line of business or going out of business entirely.
452 U.S. at 688 (emphasis added). "Not unlike" perhaps, but also not very like. Cf. Com-
ment, supra note 89, at 1107-09 (arguing that decision-bargaining should be required where
a decision affects working capital, but not where it affects investment capital).
" On this basis, one could argue that First Nat'l Maintenance should have been treated
as a runaway shop, not as a partial closing. This would have involved inquiring into whether
FNM had taken its "managerial experience" from Greenpark and used it at another location.
"I Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1981, at 1.
c The bank would need to weigh loss of capital and customers at the closed location
and harm to its reputation in its market area plus the risk that its closing would be found
illegal against the benefits in hindering unionized at its other locations. If First Nat'l
Maintenance were construed to require proof of intent to chill unionization elsewhere, the
risk of sanctions would be slight. See supra notes 292-95 and accompanying text.
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be substantially chilled when facing a vote on unionization.' The frequency
of antiunion closings and the degree of chill will be least in highly unionized
and capitalized industries. But where the employer is not generally union-
ized or where a single location involves little capital, the probability of such
closings is high and their impact devastating.28
2. Risks to Employer Profitability
An employee-protective rule would minimize the risks to the system of
employee free choice. It would require an employer to bargain, either to
agreement or impasse, before deciding to close part of its business.
Moreover, it would free employees and their unions to use their full
economic power to prevent or to protest a closing which they deemed to
be economically unjustified. Without significant detriment to employee free
choice, it might permit an employer to defend an unbargained closing on
the ground that an economic emergency, beyond the control of either the
employer or the union, had compelled the closing and would have rendered
bargaining futile."
a. The Risks To Some Employers Are Inevitable. Although an employee-
protective rule would assure unionized employees that their employer could
not avoid both Board sanctions and union self-defense by disguising an anti-
union closing in economic garb, it would also guarantee that some employers
would be delayed in, and in some cases prevented from, making purely
economic plant closing decisions. Indeed, each increment of employee pro-
tection would add to the risks to some employers' profitability. The reasons
for this generally mirror the reasons that employer protection is gained
only at the expense of employee free choice.
First, even if bargaining would not be futile, mandatory bargaining does
not guarantee the revival of a failing enterprise. The Act "does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. ' M
Unions would not be forced to accept changes (in pay, hours, work rules)
that are necessary to the employer's profitability. In fact, when an employer
requests such givebacks 31 from employees at a particular, relatively inef-
ficient plant, the union faces a conflict between its representation of those
' If such employees are at an already unionized location of an employer who is not
generally unionized, the impact on their bargaining position may also be substantial. Cf.
supra note 321.
' It is also important to note that the immediate impact on employee free choice may
bode ill for long-run industrial peace. Congress' judgment that the frustration of employee
free choice leads to industrial unrest is, of course, articulated in S 1, of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. S 151 (1976). Cf. the cases discussed supra note 106.
This in substance, was the rule adopted by the Board and approved by the Second
Circuit. See supra notes 90-99 & 104 and accompanying text.
NLRA S 8(d), 158 U.S.C. S 158(d), (1976).
33 For an early study of this recent development in collective bargaining, see Henle,
Reverse Collective Bargaining? A Look at Some Union Concession Situations, 26 INDUS. &
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employees and its representation of others in the industry; for unions have
long sought to remove wages from competition by establishing industry
or area scales."' Nor would the employer be obliged to accept what the
union, or even an objective outsider, considered a reasonable offer.' Thus,
even where good faith bargaining is not theoretically futile, in some cases
it will lead merely to costly delay.3
Second, the party bearing the burden of persuasion will necessarily lose
some meritorious cases. As the burden increases, either in terms of degree
or issues, the probability of such mistakes increases.'
Third, proof that an economic emergency rendered bargaining futile
would be difficult. No bright line distinguishes an economic emergency
beyond the control of employer and union from an economic problem which
an employer or union can solve.
Fourth, if the Board found that the employer had illicitly refused to
bargain, its remedies would potentially be quite severe. For example, in
Fibreboard the Board ordered the employer to rehire the employees whom
it had discharged and to give them back pay from the date of the Board's
decision to that of reinstatement." Hence, even if an employer believed
that bargaining would be futile and even if, in objective reality, this belief
were correct, the employer would need to weigh the risk that the Board
and courts would "later ... label its conduct an unfair labor practice.
'' 7
If an employer believed that the cost of these remedies (probability
multiplied by the amount) would exceed the savings from a speedy closing,
it would delay closing in order to bargain-even in a truly futile case.
Fifth, because the employee-protective rule would require good faith
bargaining to agreement or impasse, an employer who actually bargained
might still be found liable on the ground that it had failed to meet at
reasonable times,' refused to divulge sufficiently the basis for its economic
claims,"" engaged in surface bargaining,"m or ceased bargaining before
LAB. REL. REV. 956 (1978). For recent cases involving union concessions in return for job secur-
ity provisions, see supra note 316.
See cases discussed supra notes 198-99, 330-33, and accompanying text. Cf Greenberg,
Deviation From Wage-Fringe Standards, 21 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 197 (1967-1968).
H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
Im This will be true only where the employer is actually losing money at the site, or
where it can recoup capital (or expertise) which would immediately be reinvested at a higher
return.
See supra notes 291-95 and accompanying text.
138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962).
First Natl Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 679.
Id. at 685.
See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956) (good faith bargaining requires
disclosure of basis for management's economic claims).
14 First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 685. The risk that an employer will believe that
it bargained in good faith, only to be found later to have engaged in "surface bargaining"
is slight. The only case cited by the Court, NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d
131 (1st Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953), is typical of the surface bargaining
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impasse~1 As a result, an employer would face uncertainty as to potential
liability that would further chill swift action to stem losses.
Sixth, if a union's right to use its economic weapons depended on a find-
ing that a subject is mandatory, the employee-protective rule would free
the union to use economic pressure not only to defend itself against anti-
union closings, but also to force an employer to keep an unprofitable plant
open. If the losses expected to flow from continuing the one location were
less than those feared from union pressure, a reasonable employer would
decide to maintain an unprofitable operation."a
Finally, where the only available (or the best) solution to a problem re-
quires "speed, flexibility, and secrecy," mandatory bargaining in itself might
prevent implementation of an efficient (loss avoiding or profit promoting)
decision." However, while such an injury to management's interests might
inhere in an absolute rule mandating bargaining, it is far from clear that
the employee-protective rule under consideration would lead to such
results. 44
b. The Risks to Employers are Neither Systematic Nor Severe. Although
an employee-protective rule seems certain to injure the profitability of some
individual employers, the question remains how widespread and how prob-
able are the injuries properly attributable to such a rule. Many of the
arguments that an employee-protective rule injures profits would be just
as true, absent mandatory decision-bargaining, if effects-bargaining were
cases. The court of appeals found there that the employer had failed in his duty "to make
some reasonable effort in some direction to compose his differences with the union:' id.
at 135. Moreover, Reed & Prince had a history of strenuous illegal opposition to unioniza-
tion beginning in 1937. See NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 755 (1st Cir. 1952)
(summarizing this history).
31 Determining when an impasse has been reached justifying the employer in unilaterally
instituting its decision to close is difficult. See R. GORMAN, supra note 49, at 448-49.
34 See First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 683.
3 Id. at 682.
" The Court cited three cases in support of its concern. Id. at n.20. In International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Northeast Airlines, 473 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 845 (1972), the employer had agreed to merge with another airline. The agreement
called for consummation one year later, after approval by both the CAB and the stockholders
of both corporations. During the year between the initial agreement and the intended con-
summation, the employer refused to bargain about the effects of that merger on the
employees. This case hardly supports the proposition that mandatory decision-bargaining
would destroy necessary "speed, flexibility, and secrecy."
The two other cases which the Court cited are equally inapt. Both involved cash flow
crises, one due to bank cancellation of a line of credit, Raskin Packing Co., 246 N.L.R.B.
78 (1979), the other due to rejection of a loan application, M & M Transportation Co., 239
N.L.R.B. 73 (1978). In both cases the Board found no duty to bargain over the closing, due
to the economic emergencies that rendered bargaining futile. Moreover, in Raskin Packing
the company no sooner had closed that it began to bargain about re-opening or selling
the plant to the employees.
In addition, the Court relied on an article, Goetz, The Duty to Bargain About Changes
in Operations, 1964 DUKE L.J. 1 (1964), which predated both the Supreme Court's decision
in Fibreboard and the Board decisions excepting cases of economic emergency.
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required to precede implementation of the decision. m Furthermore, the im-
pact is muted by the exception for economic emergency. 6
Former Judge Marvin E. Frankel, in an amicus brief in support of First
National Maintenance's petition for certiorari submitted on behalf of the
Chamber of Commerce, made the boldest claim as to the feared impact of
mandatory decision-bargaining:
A vital national economy requires a maximally free flow and effective
use of its economic resources. If a healthy state of productivity is to
be maintained, business managers must be able to proceed decisively
when confronted with the necessity to terminate marginal or
uneconomic operations. The need is especially acute in our time, when
we are experiencing sharp declines either in the rate of increased pro-
ductivity or, more alarmingly, in absolute productivity figures. The deci-
sion of the Court ofAppeals... embodies a rule that will hobble managerial
flexibility in allocating both capital and labor.... At a particularly in-
opportune time in our history, it would tend to rigidify processes in
which crisp responsiveness and adaptability are prime requisites. 7
But Judge Frankel offered no evidence to support his implicit claim that
an employee-protective rule on decision-bargaining would systematically
undermine profitability- not one case, not one example, not one statistic,
not one hypothetical. 8
Justice Blackmun echoed Judge Frankel's rhetoric in a statement which,
as we have seen, was the fulcrum for the Court's test: "Management must
be free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent essen-
tial for the running of a profitable business. ' ' 9 Like Judge Frankel, he
offered no evidence to support his critical implication that an employee-
protective rule would so "constrain" management as to destroy profitability.
The question whether unfettered managerial discretion to close a part
of a business without decision-bargaining is necessary to a healthy economy
is not so easily answered. But a strong argument can be made that such
I- It is hard to calculate the degree to which the risk to employee free choice or to
employer profitability should be attributed to the rule on decision-bargaining rather than
to the rule on effects-bargaining since the risks vary with alternative formulations of the
rules.
' First Nat'l Maintenance, 627 F.2d at 601-02. See also supra note 95 and accompanying
text.
11 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States (in support
of petition for writ of certiorari) at 4-5, First Nat'l Maintenance v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
" Judge Frankel did cite two law review articles, neither of which supports his ex-
treme claims. The first argued for an accommodation of the interests of labor and manage-
ment by requiring "[djecision-bargaining.... in all cases where the employer plans to
substitute non-unit workers for unit workers." Schwartz, Plant Relocation or Partial
Termination-The Duty to Decision-Bargain, 39 FORDHAm L. Rav. 81, 100 (1970). The other
is a fascinating but theoretical piece which argued that the interests should be accom-
modated by requiring bargaining where working capital, but not investment capital, is
involved. Comment, supra note 89.
' First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 678-79. See discussion, supra notes 167-73 and
accompanying text.
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managerial autonomy is not necessary and may even be self-destructive.
An important recent study, for instance, has attributed America's recent
economic malaise to management's "analytic detachment" and to its focus
on "short-term cost reduction."'35 In contrast, constraints imposed on
managerial decision-making by labor unions and legislation compel Western
European managers to make long-term decisions." Yet, most of these coun-
tries far out-stripped America in growth of productivity during the 1970's.1
Of course, this study does not prove that mandatory decision-bargaining
would promote commercial growth. Such a proposition is probably not
susceptible to demonstration. Many factors other than plant closing restric-
tions distinguished the American and Western European economies and
societies in the 1970's.1' But these productivity increases belie the notion
that one can assume that mandatory decision-bargaining would hamstring
management and destroy profitability. In fact, these countries increased
productivity in the face of plant closing restrictions which were far more
onerous than would be mandatory decision-bargaining under the NLRA.
There are other reasons to think that decision-bargaining would promote
commerce. Productivity depends not only on managerial skill and technical
ingenuity, but also on the day-to-day performance of line employees.'- It
is at least reasonable to suppose that workers will perform better if they
believe that management respects and considers their interests, including
their investment of a career in the enterprise. 5 On the other hand, to the
I Hayes & Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline 58 HARV. Bus. REV. 67,
68 (1980).
31 Id. Hayes & Abernathy noted that
pressures from European labor unions and national governments virtually force
them to take a consistently long-term view in decision-making. German
managers, for example, must negotiate major decisions at the plant level with
worker-dominated works councils; in turn, these decisions are subject to review
by supervisory boards . . . , half of whose membership is worker elected.
Together with strict national legislation, the pervasive influence of labor unions
makes it extremely difficult to change employment levels or production locations.
Not surprisingly, labor costs in Northern Europe have more than doubled in
the past decade and are now the highest in the world.
To be successful in this environment of strictly constrained options, Euro-
pean managers feel they must employ a decision-making apparatus that grinds
very fine and very deliberately.
Id. at 76.
Similar constraints exist in Sweden, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and Italy.
See Labor Relations in Western Europe, 1980 LAB. REL. Y.B. 87 (1981); UAW, ECONOMIC
DISLOCATION: PLANT CLOSING, PLANT RELOCATIONS, AND PLANT CONVERSION (1979), reprinted
in Employee Protection and Community Stabilization Act, 1980: Hearings on S. 1609 Before
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 287-334 (1980).
Hayes & Abernathy, supra note 350, at 67.
See, e.g., Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Germany: A Comparative
Study From an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 367 (1980).
" W. OUCHI, THEORY Z: How AMERICAN BUSINESS CAN MEET THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE
5 (1981).
u Whether terror or trust is a better motivator is hotly disputed among legal educators.
See Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392 (1971).
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extent that contemporary American business communicates to its
employees that decisions are made solely in light of the bottom line, 58 or
solely to chill employees in the exercise of protected rights to unionize, 
' 7
it does nothing to engender that trust.
In sum, an employee-protective rule is certain to injure some employers
on some occasions. But the broad implication that decision-bargaining is
inconsistent with "a vital national economy" or with the autonomy "essen-
tial for the running of a profitable business" has not been substantiated.
Indeed, there are reasons to suspect that mandatory decision-bargaining,
in the long run, would promote commercial health.
3. The Balance
In balancing the risks of an employer-protective rule to employee in-
terests against the risks of an employee-protective rule to employer in-
terests, one must not lose sight of the congressional judgment that the
system of employee free choice and free association is a prerequisite for
commercial health."' Hence, only if the risk to the system of employee free
choice is insubstantial or grossly outweighed by the systematic risk to
employer profitability would the employer-protective rule be justified.
As we have seen, an employer-protective rule modeled on a broad reading
of the Supreme Court's opinion in First National Maintenance presents
systematic risks to employee rights. First, that rule invites and rewards
the cynical abuse and manipulation of law which unfortunately has
characterized the behavior of a substantial minority of employers. Second,
it diminishes the relative bargaining power of employees in general in an
area of vital interest to both employees and management.
On the other hand, an employee-protective rule would invite unions to
use their economic strength to preserve jobs at the expense of profit, even
if that harmed the whole enterprise. This risk, however, would be no dif-
ferent in kind from-the risks that Congress knowingly took when it adopted
the NLRA. The risk would be occasional, rather than systematic. Moreover,
the risk to profitability in those cases must be discounted by the benefit
to profitability that would accrue from a more mature and respectful rela-
tionship between labor and management under the regime of mandatory
decision-bargaining.
Unfortunately this was precisely the attitude communicated in Judge Frankel's
Chamber of Commerce brief. He portrayed plant closings as a mere problem of "managerial
flexibility in allocating capital and labor." Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 347, at 5. Perhaps
this may be excused given the confines of advocacy, but if it truly represents the view
of the Chamber of Commerce, it may reveal more about the cause of America's economic
problem than it intended to.
4 American Nat'l Ins. Co., supra note 50, at 401-02.
See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). Cf. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry. Co., 362 U.S. 330, 342 (1960).
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Therefore, it seems clear that on balance, and giving due deference to
the legislative judgment inherent in the structure of the Act, an employee-
protective rule would better comport with statutory purpose.
C. Deference
Assessing the comparative risks of classifying partial closing decisions
either as mandatory or as permissive is difficult. The determination is af-
fected by, and in turn will affect, many aspects of labor-management rela-
tions. Yet the Court, which had last considered a reasonably similar prob-
lem in 1964 (Fibreboard), had to decide First National Maintenance as 1
of 138 cases in the 1980 Term."'
The Board, on the other hand, dealt with this and related problems in
dozens of cases in that same period. 60 It had the opportunity to observe,
to reflect, to experiment, and to read the numerous critiques of its doc-
trine by academics, practioners, and judges of the courts of appeals. Its
I" The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 29, at 339. Archibald Cox summarized the
dilemma which this presents for the Court.
One of the misfortunes of the Supreme Court is the fragmentary view which
it receives of highly specialized and complex fields of law. The cases which
reach the court are largely a matter of happenstance .. . . The issues in im-
portant cases would merit weeks of study to thrash out all their implications.
Supra, note 55 at 1057.
' In 1979 (the year that the Board decided First Nat'l Maintenance) alone, the Board
considered 14 cases that involved management's duty to bargain over decisions which
significantly affect bargaining unit jobs, i.e., cases in which the Fibreboard-First Nat'l
Maintenance analysis is relevant, if not decisive; (1) Key Coal Co., 240 N.L.R.B. 1013 (1979)
(lease of mining properties by newly-unionized employer violated S 8(aX5)); (2) ABC Transna-
tional Transport, 244 N.L.R.B. 660 (1979) (union which had notice and discussion of shut-
downs waived right to bargain over decision itself); (3) Raskin Packing Co, 246 N.L.R.B.
78 (1979) (employer had no duty to bargain over dosing following loss of credit, but violated
S 8(a)(5) by direct dealings with employees after shutdown); (4) Lauer's Furniture Stores,
246 N.L.R.B. 360 (1979) (employer who sold store had duty to bargain over "effects"); (5)
Brooks-Scanlon, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 476 (1979) (shutdown caused by exhaustion of resources,
lumber for mill, not a mandatory subject); (6) National Family Opinion, Inc, 246 N.L.R.B.
521 (1979) (termination of printing department violated S5 8(a)(1), (3), and (5)); (7) Borg-Warner
Corp., 245 N.L.R.B. 513 (1979) (employer had duty to bargain over effects of transfer of
business to its alter ego), enforced, 663 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1981); (8) Markel Mfg. Co., 239
N.L.R.B. 1142 (1979) (unilateral layoffs violated S 8(a)(5)% (9) General Elec. Co., 240 N.L.R.B.
703 (1979) (no duty to bargain over subcontracting to test new technology which had little
impact on bargaining unit employees); (10) Merryweather Optical Co., 240 N.L.R.B. 1213
(1979) (employer who totally closed business for economic reasons had no duty to bargain
over decision, but violated duty to bargain over effects); (11) Alexander Linn Hosp. Ass'n,
244 N.L.R.B. 387 (1979) (employer violated 5 8(a)(5) by unilaterally subcontracting bargain-
ing unit work without disclosing and discussing at concurrent negotiations for new collec-
tive bargaining agreement); (12) Upper Mississippi Towing Corp., 246 N.L.R.B. 262 (1979)(no duty to bargain over subcontracting where employer had good faith doubt of union's
majority status); (13) Universal Marine Corp., 246 N.L.R.B. 445 (1979) (termination violated
SS 8(a)(1), (3), and (5)); (14) Equitable Gas Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 260 (1979), (employer violated
5 8(a)(5) by unilaterally subcontracting to adopt technological change), enforcement denied,
637 F.2d 980 (3rd Cir. 1981).
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treatment evolved from the simple and absolute to the complex and relative.
While it had announced early that decision-bargaining in general creates
"no significant intrusion on managerial freedom," 1 it later determined that
managerial interests predominate in decisions which involve a "signficant
investment or withdrawal of capital, affecting the scope and ultimate direc-
tion of an enterprise." '62 Furthermore, it found the employee interest to
be nullified where a closing resulted from an economic emergency that
rendered bargaining futile.3 1
The wise course for the Court would have been caution. Such caution
has long been embodied in the Court's doctrine of deference, which requires
that "if [the Board's] construction of the statute is reasonably defensible,
it should not be rejected merely because the courts might prefer another
view of the statute."3" Unfortunately, in other cases the Court has
substituted its judgment for that of the Board without explaining why
deference was inappropriate. 5 Nonetheless, deference should not be
treated as a mere makeweight. Given the relative competences of the
courts-including, perhaps especially, the Supreme Court-and the Board,
it is particularly appropriate for the courts to yield to the Board in deter-
mining the scope of mandatory bargaining.
As recently as Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB,365 the Court insisted that the
Board's determination of mandatory subjects should be accorded "con-
siderable deference."" 7 The Court offered two reasons, both of them as ap-
plicable to First National Maintenance as to Ford. First, Congress rejected
attempts to specify the subjects of mandatory bargaining in favor of an
express delegation of broad authority to the Board. This "conscious deci-
sion to . . . delegat[e] 38 must be respected unless the delegation is
-1 Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 569 (1966).
- General Motors Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. 951, 952 (1971).
See e.g., Raskin Packing Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 78 (1979).
Ford Motor Co. (Chicago Stampling Plant) v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979). Accord
Charles D. Bonanno Linen Ser. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1982); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
313 U.S. 177 (1941).
* Professor Kenneth Davis has criticized the Court at great length for announcing these
two approaches to judicial review of administrative determinations of law, while evading
the question of when it is appropriate to use one rather than the other. 4 K. DAVIS, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE SS 30.01-30.11 (1958, Supp. 1970 & Supp. 1980). See also Pittston
Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976).
s 441 U.S. 488 (1979). Cf. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49
(2d Cir. 1976) (deference not appropriate where agency created to umpire, rather than to
make policy).
= Id. at 495.
1 Id. at 496. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that "the court shall decide
all relevant questions of law [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provisions ...."
5 U.S.C. S 706 (1976). But the Act specifically denies such judicial authority where "agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. S 701 (1976). Ford, and the
legislative history cited therein, made it plain that the task of classifying subjects as man-
datory or permissive was committed to the Board's discretion. Hence the appropriate test
was whether the Board had abused this discretion.
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unconstitutional. 69 Second, the Board has "special expertise""37 in classify-
ing the subjects of bargaining. Whether the Board has "expertise" or merely
"experience" is debatable. 71 Nonetheless it is clear that the Board has had
ample opportunity to consider the significance of decision-bargaining to
employee and employer interests, its relationship to other aspects of labor-
management relations, and the practical problems of proof and of
manipulability under the alternative constructions. This experience,
reflected in the evolution of Board doctrine, is precisely what Congress
sought to bring to bear on a problem which it found not susceptible to prior
legislative specificity.
The Ford Court did not mention two other equally cogent reasons for
deference, based on the different characteristics of Board and judicial
decision-making. The Board was designed to permit experimentation"o
and to be more open to changing political winds than the Court."" Because
its members are appointed for only five years, and because it confronts the
same or related problems many times in a short span, the Board "can pro-
nounce rules, watch them in operation, and modify or abandon them as their
impact is shown to be undesirable." '374
The short term of Board members also encourages greater sensitivity
to "the social and political climate at any given time.""s The extent to which
political shifts in Board doctrine are desirable may be debated. 7 But in
the context of labor disputes, political decisions, whether by the Board or
by the Court, are inevitable. As Clyde Summers put it: "There can be no
impartial rules governing the relationship between a tree and the wood-
man's ax, even though we let the chips fall where they may."'3" This in-
" See Schector Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Cf. American Textile
Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., & Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(Congress "unconstitutionally delegated to the Executive Branch the authority to make
the 'hard policy choices' properly the task of the legislature.").
'* 441 U.S. at 495 (quoting from Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea
Co., 381 U.S. 676, 686 (1965)). Cf. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35,
50 (2d Cir. 1976) (no deference required to umpiring agency that had no experience under
new statute).
3' See, e.g., Winter, Judicial Review ofAgency Decisions: The Labor Board and the Court,
1968 SuP. CT. REV. 53, 60.
Id. at 63-64.
Id. at 64-67; Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV.
93 (1954); Murphy, The National Labor Relations Board-An Appraisal, 52 MINN. L. REV.
819 (1968).
' Winter, supra note 371, at 63.
'1 H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 71 (1947) (minority report), reprinted in 1 LEG.
HIST. LMRA, supra note 54, at 362.
"6 Winter, supra note 371, at 64-67. Consider, for example, the Board's zigzag decisions
on regulation of campaign misrepresentations. See Hollywood Ceramics Co, 140 N.L.R.B.
221 (1962) (regulated, Shopping Kart Food Market, 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977) (deregulated);
General Knit, 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978) (reregulated); Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co, 110 L.R.R.M.
1489 (1982) (re-deregulated).
' Summers, supra note 373, at 97.
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herent partiality explains why such decisions should be made by the more
responsive institution.378
Moreover, none of the reasons that have traditionally been offered for
refusing to defer in particular cases apply to First National Maintenance.
First, where an agency fails to articulate the experiential or factual basis
of its construction, a court cannot determine the reasonableness of the out-
come; hence, the court must decide the question de novo or remand to the
agency. 79 While the Board has often been criticized for failing to disclose
the facts or the reasoning underlying its judgments,' that can hardly be
said of its decision-bargaining opinions."
Second, where an agency fails to apply a "proper legal standard ... or
... to give the plain language of the standard its ordinary meaning," no
deference is due.' Unlike the cases to which this exception has been ap-
plied, First National Maintenance involved no narrow and clear statutory
standard or definition.3"
Third, where a Board decision is "fundamentally inconsistent with the
structure of the Act and the function of the sections relied upon,"- the
Court may refuse to follow it. If the doctrine of deference is to serve the
functions ascribed to it above, this limitation can only apply in cases of clear
error, not to "error" based on inference piled on inference from some vague
"ulterior purpose."' Likewise, it would be inappropriate where the Agency
was specifically delegated policy-making authority.
17 In United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), the Court announced
that "regulatory legislation ... is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless ... it is
of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests on some rational basis within
the knowledge and experience of the legislators." Id. at 152. The Court, of course, went
on in its most famous footnote to suggest a "narrower scope" for deference in cases involv-
ing legislation which seems to conflict with a "specific constitutional prohibition," or "which
restricts [the] political processes," or which burdens "discrete and insular minorities:' Id.
at 152 n.4. If Congress may delegate its policy-making power under only the most general
guidelines, as it did in S 8(d), and if Carolene Products correctly describes the judicial role
in reviewing legislation, then the Court owed the Board deference in this case.
This theory may help to explain the contours of judicial deference to administrative agen-
cies. If Congress specifically delegated authority and if the delegation was proper, deference
is owed. This interpretation is fully consistent with the judicial review provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act. See supra, note 368. Cf. WELLINGTON, supra note 155.
M See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Pittston
Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 47 & n.13, 50 (2d Cir. 1976).
' See, e.g., NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894, 904 (2d Cir. 1971).
"1 The Board's opinion in Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 651 (1966), demonstrates
thorough consideration of the issues. In fact, the Board there discussed crucial factors which
the Court in First Nat'l Maintenance apparently did not consider, for example, the rela-
tionship between effects-bargaining and decision-bargaining. That the Board issued a sum-
mary opinion in First Nat'l Maintenance should make no difference; the case raised no
point which the Board had not thoroughly considered in the past.
Ford Motor Co., 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979).
Cf. Allied Chemical Workers Union v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 166
(1971) (retirees are not employees).
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965).
Judge Friendly has suggested that this exception could swallow the deference princi-
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In sum, all of the policies that counsel deference generally- congressional
intent, experience, the capacity to experiment, and political sensitivity-
pointed to deference in First National Maintenance. No reason for not defer-
ring in the particular case appeared. The Court's fundamental error was
to assume that it "is the institution best suited to make labor policy."-"
Its arrogation of a function which Congress clearly intended for the Board
was unjustified.
CONCLUSION
If First National Maintenance is broadly construed to insulate managerial
autonomy, it will pose a serious threat to the system of employee free choice
which lies at the core of our national labor policy. The test which the Court
announced for determining whether a subject which directly and significant-
ly affects employee job security is mandatory or permissive seriously dis-
counts employee interests, while exaggerating those of management. The
Court's application of that test to the facts in First National Maintenance
itself suggests that it will be all too easy for determined, antiunion
employers to manipulate the "facts" in order to frustrate their employees'
decision to unionize.
Nonetheless, such a test might be appropriate if it were necessary to
fulfilling the ultimate purpose of the Act. But, in fact, the Court's approach
to weighing the competing interests is deeply inconsistent with the con-
gressional policy judgment that employee free choice must be protected
to reduce the long range risk of industrial unrest. Moreover, it is clear that
Congress specifically delegated to the Board the task of deciding which sub-
jects are mandatory and which are not.
Yet, unless it is overruled by the Supreme Court or negated by plant
closing legislation, First National Maintenance stands as the law of the land.
ple whole:
In ... Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 .. .(1974) ... the Court held that
"In order for an agency interpretation to be granted deference, it must be
consistent with the congressional purpose"; this very nearly eliminates the
"deference" principle as regards statutory construction altogether since if the
agency's determination is found by a court to be consistent with the congres-
sional purpose, it presumably would be affirmed on that ground without any
need for deference.
Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976).
Ruiz involved welfare claims of Indians living near but not on a reservation. The Bureau
of Indian Affairs denied the claims without complying with its own procedures. Moreover,
the BIA misrepresented the coverage of its rules to Congress. In sum, the agency violated
the "trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and
sometimes exploited people." 415 U.S. at 236 (quoting from Seminole Nation v. U.S., 316
U.S. 286, 296 (1942)). Indeed, none of the policies which support deference, see supra notes
359-84 and accompanying text, was relevant in Ruiz.
Winter, supra note 371, at 73.
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While the Court's solicitude for "management's fear of later evaluations
labeling its conduct an unfair labor practice" suggests that only a broad
reading of the decision is consistent with the Court's construction of the
Act, the opinion itself suggests a number of bases on which the Board (and/or
the courts of appeals) can reduce its impact. 87 First, the Court insulated
only the employer's decision to close a specific part of its business. Thus,
the Board should distinguish decision-bargaining from effects-bargaining,
as well as from bargaining over a possible future closing decision. Second,
the Court interpreted the decision as one that permanently terminated a
distinct part of the employer's business. Hence, the Board should also
distinguish employer decisions after which the employer will continue to
provide the same product or service in the same market. Third, the Court
emphasized that FNM's motivation (as found by the A.L.J.) was purely
economic. The Board should develop appropriate standards for the burden
of proof on this issue. Because First National Maintenance was decided
under section 8(a)(5), rather than section 8(a)(3), the analogy to the stand-
ards of Darlington is clearly inappropriate.
Given the present political composition of the Board, it is not likely to
I John Irving, the former NLRB General Counsel, has argued that the Court's mandate
was clear and should be read broadly. Supra, note 29. He noted that "the decision to close
or sell at a particular location [seldom] rest[s] on the pure determination that it is best
for the enterprise to go out of business entirely ... in that area." Id. at 225. Hence, if
the "uncertaint[y] about which the Supreme Court was so critical," id. at 226, is to be avoided,
partial closings must be broadly defined and determination of the duty to bargain on related
business decisions must be determined on general principles, rather than case by case.
Irving's argument would be persuasive if the Court mandate were clear; but it is not.
The Court expressly held only that a management "deci[sion] ... to shut down part of
its business purely for economic reasons" is not a mandatory subject of bargaining. 452
U.S. at 686. The Court recognized the Board's authority to require effects bargaining "in
a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time." Id. at 682. It left open the question of
criteria to distinguish a partial closing from other similar business decisions. Id. at 686
n.22. Moreover, it failed to articulate the meaning of "purely... economic reasons" or
to allocate the burden of proof. Id- Finally, the Court tacked-on a lonely paragraph of "specific
facts" to the opinion-"to illustrate the limits of [its] holding." Id. at 687.
Thus it appears that Irving missed the point when he claimed that a case-by-case ap-
plication of First National Maintenance would ignore the Court's "clear signal." Irving,
supra note 29, at 226. The Court sent not one clear signal, but two distinct and conflicting
signals, as even a casual examination of the Court's limiting facts should make plain. One
cannot heed these facts and, at the same time, give employers confidence that their deci-
sions will be free from "later evaluations."
The explanation is obvious: What appeared to be a clear majority set to defend managerial
autonomy included some justices who were not prepared to go nearly that far. Why thesejustices chose to join the Court's opinion rather than to concur in the judgment and why
the majority chose to accept the limiting paragraph are questions the answers to which
are not vouched to supplicants of the Oracle. See Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court,
95 HARV. L. REv. 802 (1982) (explaining inconsistent decisions in terms of the theory of social
choice). Nonetheless, the dissonance invites the Board and the courts to treat First National
Maintenance not as a general rejection of employee interests in bargaining over job securi-
ty, but rather as the beginning of analysis. This author is presently working on an article
exploring these limiting possibilities in more detail.
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accept the challenge of developing limitations on First National
Maintenance. Yet the absence of such limitations may lead to increased
pressure for plant-closing legislation. It would be ironic if the ultimate result
of First National Maintenance were the imposition of much more exten-
sive limitations on managerial autonomy.
